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SETTLED LAW
G. Alexander Nunn* & Alan M. Trammell**
“Settled law” appears frequently in judicial opinions—sometimes to
refer to binding precedent, sometimes to denote precedent that has
acquired a more mystical permanence, and sometimes as a substantive
part of legal doctrine. During judicial confirmation hearings, the term
is bandied about as Senators, advocacy groups, and nominees discuss
judicial philosophy and deeper ideological commitments. But its
varying and often contradictory uses have given rise to a concern that
settled law is simply a repository for hopelessly disparate ideas.
Without definitional precision, it risks becoming nothing more than
empty jargon.
We contend that settled law is actually a meaningful concept, even
though it does not embody any single, unified idea. First, we argue that
controlling law, which essentially corresponds to binding precedent, is
a fundamentally distinct concept that is neither synonymous with nor a
subset of settled law. Second, we draw on seminal jurisprudential
theories to build a taxonomy of five frameworks that capture how legal
actors can invoke settled law, both rhetorically and doctrinally. Third,
we demonstrate how a clearer understanding of settled law can make
doctrine more coherent and administrable. Situating certain doctrines
within the appropriate frameworks, and not conflating controlling law
and settled law, would resolve myriad doctrinal anomalies. Moreover,
greater conceptual precision can improve political rhetoric during the
confirmation process by promoting clearer dialogue and discouraging
legal actors from talking past one another.

* Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law.
** Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. For helpful
discussion and comments on earlier drafts, we are grateful to Khaled Beydoun, Pamela
Bookman, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Zachary Clopton, Steve Clowney, David Marcus, Merritt
McAlister, Urja Mittal, Jason Parkin, Daniel Rice, Matthew Shaw, and Larry Solum. We also
thank Chris Chino for invaluable research assistance and the Virginia Law Review editors for
their excellent work in bringing this project to fruition.
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INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to say that Roe v. Wade1 is “settled law”? Or
Citizens United v. FEC?2 Or even Brown v. Board of Education?3
The idea of settled law has played a pivotal role in Supreme Court
confirmation hearings for more than thirty years, and it has animated
myriad legal doctrines as far back as the eighteenth century.4 Yet the
meaning of settled law has proved stubbornly elusive. Does it refer simply
to the idea that the Supreme Court has decided a particular issue, or does
it connote something more enduring about particular precedents? Does it
imply that a precedent is somehow “right”? Which courts (or other legal
actors) have the power to settle the law? And how exactly does that
happen?

1

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4
See, e.g., Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 118 (1795) (Cushing, J.)
(describing as “settled law and usage” the idea that “courts of Admiralty can carry into
execution decrees of foreign Admiralties”).
2
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Even though settled law had come up during earlier confirmation
hearings,5 it first took center stage in the political arena during the Bork
hearings. Under intense scrutiny about his academic writings, Judge Bork
repeatedly tried to parry criticism of his controversial views by promising
over and over that he would respect “settled law,” even if he disagreed
with it.6 And notably, Judge Bork used that term to mean something quite
distinct from the familiar principles of stare decisis. 7 Since then, every
Supreme Court nominee has faced questions about settled law, even as
the term’s ambiguity has grown increasingly apparent.8
Discussions of settled law have become even more prominent in recent
years as President Trump’s judicial nominees faced pointed questions
about whether they agreed with certain precedents or, at a minimum,

5

See, e.g., Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 356 (1986) (statement of Rehnquist, J.) (declaring that the
incorporation of the right to a speedy trial through the Fourteenth Amendment “is settled law,
and [his] opinions reflect it”); Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 83 (1986) (statement of Sen. Specter) (asking whether
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), “is a settled issue”); id. at 104 (statement
of Sen. Biden) (“If it’s on the books, if it is settled constitutional law for an extended period
of time, and the argument to overturn that settled constitutional principle does not in fact meet
the test of on its face being consistent with what the correct constitutional principle is, do you
have to stick with what the settled law is?”).
6 See, e.g., Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 279 (1987)
(statement of Bork, J.) (repeatedly calling Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969),
“settled”); id. at 327 (declaring that “I certainly have no desire to go running around trying to
upset settled bodies of law”); id. at 423 (“It seems to me that the settled law is now that the
person writing the book does not have to prove that it is political or any way connected to
politics. The settled law is the Government has to prove it is obscene.”); id. at 428 (“I am not
changing my criticism of [Brandenburg]. I just accept it as settled law.”); id. at 434 (“It’s
settled law. . . . I have said that I accept that body of precedent and will apply it. That’s all
I’ve said.”); id. at 438 (declaring that “some things are absolutely settled in the law” and that
“[a]ny judge understands that you don’t tear those things up”); id. at 587 (“I accept them as
settled law. I have not said that I agree with all of those opinions now, but they are settled law
and as a judge that does it for me.”); id. at 667 (“I have repeatedly said there are some things
that are too settled to be overturned.”).
7 See id. at 989 (statement of Sen. Specter) (“[Judge Bork] flatly made a commitment to
accept settled law. On the privacy cases he has not made that commitment. He has talked about
various considerations of reliance and stare decisis, but he has made no commitment on
privacy . . . .”).
8 See infra notes 278–85 and accompanying text.
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regarded them as settled.9 Sometimes nominees have refused to engage.10
On other occasions, Senators and nominees have appeared to use “settled
law” in conspicuously different ways,11 a phenomenon brought into stark
relief during Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing. Responding to a
question from Senator Feinstein, the future Justice declared that Roe v.
Wade was “settled as a precedent of the Supreme Court, entitled to respect
under principles of stare decisis.”12 The next day, The New York Times
published a previously confidential e-mail from 2003 in which
Kavanaugh had written: “I am not sure that all legal scholars refer to Roe
as the settled law of the land at the Supreme Court level since [the] Court
can always overrule its precedent, and three current Justices on the Court
would do so.”13 These statements provided grist for some to call him
9 See Laura Meckler & Robert Barnes, Trump Judicial Nominees Decline To Endorse
Brown v. Board Under Senate Questioning, Wash. Post (May 16, 2019, 7:28 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-judicial-nominees-decline-to-endorse-brown-v-board-under-senate-questioning/2019/05/16/d5409d58-7732-11e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html [https://perma.cc/F5FK-GNPW] (describing how Sen. Blumenthal
frequently asks whether nominees regard Brown as correct); Marcia Coyle, Revisiting Amy
Coney Barrett Statements About Abortion Rights, Nat’l L.J. (Sept. 25, 2020, 3:12 PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/09/25/revisiting-amy-coney-barrett-statements-about-abortion-rights/?slreturn=20200908080816 [https://perma.cc/2EKP-YDQE] (describing how Sen. Blumenthal asked then-nominee Amy Coney Barrett if she “think[s] Roe v.
Wade was correctly decided”).
10 See Meckler & Barnes, supra note 9 (describing nominees who refused to directly answer
Sen. Blumenthal’s question about Brown); see also Ariane de Vogue, Judicial Nominees Are
Changing Their Approach to the ‘Brown v. Board’ Question at Senate Hearings, CNN (Feb.
10, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/10/politics/brown-v-board-senate-judicial-nominees/index.html [https://perma.cc/8BP5-7PBZ] (noting that in response to Sen. Blumenthal’s
question about Brown, now-Judge Neomi Rao described the case as “longstanding precedent
of the Supreme Court,” declared that it was “not appropriate” to comment on the “correctness
of particular precedents,” but argued that “it’s hard for me to imagine a circumstance in which
Brown v. Board would be overruled by the Supreme Court”).
11 For example, in 2010, then-Senator Sessions suggested that “settled law” connoted “a
more firm acknowledgment of the power of that ruling” than mere “precedent” and asked
then-U.S. Solicitor General Elena Kagan whether she was using “settled law” and “precedent”
interchangeably. The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 231
(2010) (statement of Sen. Sessions). She responded: “I don’t mean any difference.” Id.
(statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor General of the United States).
12 C-SPAN, Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part
1, C-SPAN (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?449705-1/supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-confirmation-hearing-day-2-part-1 [https://perma.cc/7N8B-S2MC]
(relevant exchange occurring from 48:25 to 49:10).
13
Charlie Savage, Leaked Kavanaugh Documents Discuss Abortion and Affirmative
Action, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/politics/kavanaugh-leaked-documents.html [https://perma.cc/3C4Q-7SAH].
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disingenuous.14 Others argued that he was making distinct and mutually
consistent claims—a prediction of whether the Court would revisit the
abortion precedents versus an assessment of whether those precedents
should stand undisturbed.15
Settled law is far more than an enigmatic buzzword that gets bandied
about during confirmation hearings, though; it also serves an important
structural role and has profound doctrinal implications. For example,
lower-court judges often speak about their duty to follow the settled law
of superior courts.16 Most surprisingly, an array of doctrines depend
substantively on whether the law is “settled.” In the realm of
constitutional torts, for instance, a plaintiff attempting to bring a Section
1983 claim usually must overcome the defendant’s qualified immunity by
showing that the defendant violated a constitutional rule that was “clearly
established” under “settled law.”17 So, too, settled law undergirds the
circumstances when post-conviction relief is available,18 lawyers’ ethical
obligations under Rule 11,19 standards of review,20 and a host of other
doctrines.21 Across these contexts, though, a firm understanding of what
counts as settled law has proved chimerical.

14

See, e.g., Igor Bobic, Susan Collins Downplays Brett Kavanaugh Email About Abortion
Rights and ‘Settled Law’, HuffPost (Sept. 6, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/brett-kavanaugh-susan-collins-roe-v-wade_n_5b9165b1e4b0511db3e04121 [https://perma.cc/4YMT-J9S5] (quoting Sen. Blumenthal urging undecided Republicans to “read this
[email] and then tell [him] Judge Kavanaugh has been candid with [them]”).
15 See, e.g., id. (quoting Sen. Collins saying that Kavanaugh “was merely stating a fact,
which is that three [Justices] on the [C]ourt were anti-Roe,” and “[i]f that’s the case and he
was not expressing his view, then [she was] not sure what the point of it [was]”).
16 See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
17 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018); see also id. at 591 (“The rule
applied by [the court below] was not clearly established because it was not ‘settled law.’”
(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991))).
18 E.g., In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that whether the settled
law established the legality of a conviction is part of the Fourth Circuit’s three-prong test to
determine the availability of a writ of habeas corpus).
19 E.g., Pro. Mgmt. Assocs. v. KPMG LLP, 345 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2003) (remanding
and ordering the lower court to impose a Rule 11 sanction to a plaintiff’s counsel for ignoring
the “well-settled law” of res judicata under the circumstances of the case).
20 E.g., United States v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v.
Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014)) (holding that “if the settled law of the
Supreme Court or this circuit establishes that an error has occurred,” the error satisfies the
plain error standard of review).
21
See, e.g., Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007))
(fraudulent joinder).
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Given the definitional morass, one might conclude that “‘settled law’
is just a euphemism.”22 On this view, the term is so capacious as to
become meaningless, conveying nothing useful about the weight that
precedent deserves or the conditions (if any) under which a court should
overrule it.
Our principal goal is to show that settled law does coherent and
powerful work, even though it resists a single, overarching definition. In
fact, settled law makes sense only when one appreciates that it comprises
several distinct notions that do not share a common attribute. A more
precise understanding of this hydra-like term has the power to clarify
doctrine and improve political rhetoric. What seem like conceptual
oddities in a number of doctrines actually make good theoretical sense
when viewed through the lens of settled law. Moreover, settled law can
play a meaningful role in confirmation hearings, but only if legal actors
fully grasp its multifaceted nature. It offers a productive way to explore
how politicians, judicial nominees, and the general public understand the
judicial role, including how the obligations of Supreme Court Justices
differ from those of lower-court judges.
We begin in Part I by differentiating between two concepts that we call
controlling law and settled law. Controlling law essentially refers to the
concept of binding precedent, including in its most conspicuous
manifestation: an inferior court’s duty to follow the precedents of superior
courts. Although one might think of controlling law as a species of settled
law, we argue that the two are actually distinct ideas that address very
different questions and are, at most, only tangentially related. Much of the
confusion about settled law, in fact, stems from conflating these concepts.
Not allowing discussions of settled law to revert into the familiar language
of controlling law is thus a critical first step.
Part II demonstrates that settled law is not just an empty euphemism,
even though it doesn’t embrace a single idea. In fact, settled law makes
sense only when one appreciates that it comprises several notions that do
not share a common attribute.
On an intuitive level, the starkest divide lies between normative and
descriptive claims about settled law. For example, someone might
classify Brown as settled law, normatively, because it achieved the right
substantive result. Or, irrespective of Brown’s fundamental correctness,
Ilya Somin, Why “Settled Law” Isn’t Really Settled—and Why That’s Often a Good
Thing, Reason: The Volokh Conspiracy (Sept. 9, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://reason.com/2018/09/09/why-settled-law-isnt-really-settled-and/ [https://perma.cc/4NSU-3N4A].
22
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one might view it as descriptively settled because everyone recognizes
that it’s here to stay. Even within these broad categories, though, variation
abounds. For example, calling Brown normatively settled could mean that
the decision was consonant with the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment or, alternatively, that it achieved a socially desirable
outcome by advancing the cause of racial justice. Calling Brown
descriptively settled could mean that the Supreme Court has left the
precedent undisturbed for more than fifty years, that a future Court is
unlikely to overrule it, that principles of stare decisis have effectively
entrenched it, or that it has achieved wide popular acceptance.
We bring theoretical rigor to this intuition about the descriptivenormative divide by overlaying it with seminal jurisprudential theories:
formalism, realism, and legal process theory. Based on these theories, we
develop a taxonomy of five concepts that “settled law” can embrace.
The first two concepts derive from legal formalism.23 As a normative
matter, a formalist insists that law is settled when it has achieved the
demonstrably “right” result based on the law’s internal logic.24 But from
a descriptive perspective, a formalist might accept that law is settled—
even if it has not reached the objectively correct result—when the
concerns of stare decisis, such as reliance, predictability, and basic
fairness, are paramount.25
The next two concepts of settled law draw on the legal realist school.26
Descriptively, a realist regards law as settled when it faces no material
threat of reversal.27 Normatively, a realist will insist that law is settled
23 See, e.g., Warren Sandmann, The Argumentative Creation of Individual Liberty, 23
Hastings Const. L.Q. 637, 645 (1996) (“Legal formalism . . . is in its many guises one of the
more dominant approaches to judicial decisionmaking.”).
24 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1983).
25 See Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of
Precedent, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1843, 1874 (2013) (citing Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court
in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated
Rights, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155, 186, 192–95 (2006)) (describing a “neoformalist” model of
stare decisis in which even judicial “mistakes” can and should create binding precedents, if
they are decided through a formalistic process of reasoning); Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism
and Stare Decisis, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1921 (2017) (describing Justice Scalia’s approach
to the tension between the value of stare decisis and a formalistic, originalist reading of the
Constitution).
26 See Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 749, 749 (2013) (“Legal
Realism is conventionally understood, in part, to question legal doctrine’s determinacy and
positive law’s causal effect on judicial decisions.”).
27 As we build out below, it essentially constitutes an exercise in Holmesian Prediction
Theory. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 460–61 (1897).
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only when it has achieved the “right” result, but she understands that idea
very differently than a formalist does. The correct result for a legal realist
corresponds to some external frame of reference, such as utility,
efficiency, or social justice.28
The fifth and final concept of settled law draws on legal process theory,
which focuses on a legal decision’s methodological process rather than
its substantive outcome.29 For the legal process theorist, law is settled if
and when a duly constituted court reaches a decision through an
appropriate methodology, and within this framework the descriptive and
normative perspectives essentially become inseparable.
A simple illustration might help reify these five theoretical concepts.
Consider the question: “Is Marbury v. Madison settled law?” Nearly
everyone would say “yes,” but Table 1 identifies more precisely the five
different ideas that someone could intend to communicate when asserting
that Marbury is settled.

28 For the foundational realist works encouraging an interdisciplinary approach to law, see
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev.
809 (1935); Jerome Frank, Law & the Modern Mind (Transaction Publishers 2009) (1930);
Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences—Especially Sociology, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
1286 (1949); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1 &
3), 24 Harv. L. Rev. 591 (1911), 25 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1912).
29 The seminal tome of the legal process school is Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks,
The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). For an overview of the related concept of
procedural justice, see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181 (2004).
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Table 1: The Taxonomy of Settled Law
Framework

Marbury v. Madison is settled law.

Normative Formalism

Marbury arrived at the objectively
understanding of constitutional law.

correct

Descriptive Formalism

Principles of stare decisis require continued
adherence to Marbury.

Descriptive Realism

There is no material chance that the Supreme Court
will overrule Marbury in the near future.

Normative Realism

Marbury achieved a desirable outcome in light of its
intra- and extra-legal consequences.

Legal Process

Marbury merits continued adherence because it was
issued by a duly constituted court employing an
appropriate methodology.

In Part III, we show why developing a clearer understanding of settled
law is far more than an academic exercise. At the intensely practical level,
settled law suffuses a diverse array of doctrines, and failing to appreciate
how it functions has led to pervasive confusion and mistakes. Our
principal example comes from the qualified immunity context. Although
courts often cast the relevant inquiry in terms of controlling law—whether
binding precedent has clearly established that a particular right exists—
this approach has invited a host of anomalies and errors. Instead, we argue
that viewing qualified immunity through the lens of settled law makes
much more sense doctrinally and normatively. Moreover, understanding
qualified immunity as turning on settled law—specifically, two of the
taxonomy’s five concepts—alleviates nearly all of the current conceptual
problems and has the potential to refocus courts on the heart of the
inquiry.
Finally, we argue that a more nuanced understanding of settled law can
enhance legal dialogue, particularly the conversation about judicial
nominations. Too often legal actors talk past one another because they use
“settled law” to convey different ideas, and that in turn can lead to
unfounded allegations of bad faith. On this level, the taxonomy is not a
panacea; far from it. But greater conceptual clarity about settled law can
train attention on the debates that truly matter rather than a bewitching
semantic game.
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I. CONTROLLING LAW AND SETTLED LAW
The notion of settled law is elusive precisely because it admits of
wildly varying meanings. At the outset, we want to hive off one of those
potential definitions, which is, in fact, a fundamentally different idea—
one that can wreak havoc in both doctrinal and political discussions of
settled law. Accordingly, in this Part, we distinguish between the
important but distinct concepts of controlling law and settled law.
Someone might suggest that law is most obviously settled when a court
has an absolute duty to apply a certain legal rule. For example, when a
federal district court judge in California observes that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has articulated a three-part test to govern a
particular theory of personal jurisdiction, that judge might refer to the test
as “settled Ninth Circuit law.”30 On this understanding, settled law tracks
traditional notions of binding precedent, and indeed that is exactly what
many courts mean when they claim that law is settled.31
Defining settled law with respect to binding precedent is not
necessarily wrong, but it is unhelpful and, at worst, can lead to profound
and avoidable confusion. Instead, we suggest that these courts are
referring to controlling law.32 Whether law is controlling in a given case
turns on a very specific question: Does judicial hierarchy or structure
require one court (or panel) to abide by another court’s (or panel’s)
precedential decision? Or, more simply, is there binding precedent on
point?
The general mechanics of binding precedent, and thus controlling law,
are familiar and relatively straightforward, even if the deep theory of why
courts adhere to precedent is more complicated.33 The clearest example

30 Hassen v. Nahyan, No. CV 09-01106, 2010 WL 11459204, at *4, *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18,
2010).
31 See, e.g., Norwood v. Hamblin, No. 04-cv-813, 2010 WL 3516903, at *3–4 (W.D. Wis.
Sept. 3, 2010); Lee v. Coughlin, 643 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1986); Carr v. Cook
County, No. 85 C 05731, 1985 WL 1861, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1985).
32 Some courts explicitly link the notions of settled law and controlling law. See, e.g., Couch
v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010); McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76,
76 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing In re Heddendorf, 263 F.2d 887, 888–89 (1st Cir. 1959)).
33 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3–5 (1989);
Charles L. Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1625, 1626, 1631 (2013); Evan
H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev.
817, 820–21 (1994); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50
Duke L.J. 503, 503–04 (2000); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 724 (1988); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L.
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of binding precedent is vertical stare decisis—when superior courts create
precedent that an inferior court is duty-bound to follow.34 This power
almost always depends on whether a superior court may revise an inferior
court’s decisions.35 So, for example, a federal judge on the U.S. District
Court for the District of Kansas must follow decisions issued by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. But a judge in the Central District
of California, part of the Ninth Circuit, has no absolute obligation to
follow Tenth Circuit decisions, which it treats as merely persuasive.36
Beyond the quintessential example of vertical stare decisis, precedent
can exert the same binding force in other settings. For example, all U.S.
courts of appeals follow a rule of absolute stare decisis. That is, one panel
must adhere to an earlier panel decision within the same circuit, and only
the court sitting en banc may overrule a panel decision.37 Similarly, in the
classic Erie38 scenario, a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the
relevant state’s substantive law.39 So, too, when one state is applying a
sister state’s law, the forum must treat the sister state’s precedents as
binding and apply them in good faith.40

Rev. 571, 571–72 (1987); David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 929, 929–30 (2008).
34 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 953,
957 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997, 2025 (1994);
Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 203 (2014).
35 Caminker, supra note 33, at 824–25.
36 See Alan M. Trammell, Precedent and Preclusion, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 565, 581
(2017). There are exceptions. In California, inferior state courts are bound by the decisions of
all divisions of California Courts of Appeal, even those that lack revisory authority over the
inferior courts. See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937, 940 (Cal. 1962)
(en banc); 9 Witkin, California Procedure § 497 (5th ed. 2008).
37 See Harrison, supra note 33, at 517; Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process,
74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1011, 1017–18, 1018 n.20 (2003); cf. Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265,
268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (panel decision overruling earlier precedent with approval of full
court).
38 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
39 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 78); see also Kevin
M. Clermont, Degrees of Deference: Applying vs. Adopting Another Sovereign’s Law, 103
Cornell L. Rev. 243, 259 (2018) (“Application of state law under Erie calls for pretty blind
adherence by the federal actor to the state’s view of the content of that law.”).
40 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 834–35 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945)) (arguing that the forum must “attempt in good faith to apply them when necessary as
they would be applied by home state courts”). In theory, the duty remains absolute. But the
Supreme Court polices only the most egregious violations. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717, 730–31 (1988).
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Describing these scenarios as ones in which courts create binding
precedent—and controlling law—does not ignore important nuances. For
example, the reasons why precedent is binding can vary based on
context.41 Courts supposedly constrained by binding precedent can
distinguish or narrow the precedent.42 And there is always some
squishiness at the margins.43
At their core, though, all of the scenarios contemplate that if binding
precedent is on point, a court constrained by that precedent has a virtually
unflagging obligation to obey it.44 This is what we mean by saying that
the precedent controls: a structural reason compels a court to follow and
apply it. Thus, controlling law contrasts markedly with other situations in
which courts choose to follow precedent, either because the earlier
decision is quite persuasive45 or because the values of stare decisis, such
as reliance and predictability, are paramount.46 So, even when the
Supreme Court says that it does not lightly overrule its own precedents,

41

The various aspects of the Erie doctrine rest on a plethora of shifting constitutional and
statutory rationales. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693,
697–98 (1974). And states’ duty to apply one another’s laws faithfully derives from the
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 730–31.
42 Distinguishing means that “the precedent, when best understood, does not actually apply”
to the case at hand. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 Colum.
L. Rev. 1861, 1862 (2014). Narrowing involves interpreting a prior case as “more limited in
scope than . . . the best available reading.” Id. at 1863.
43 For example, in the Erie context, the Supreme Court has essentially said that a state’s
highest court reigns supreme. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997). But in
narrow, specific circumstances, a court may anticipate that a state’s highest court would
overrule the putatively binding precedent. See 19 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4507, at 149 (3d ed. 2016). This might
look like an exercise in prediction theory, a hallmark of descriptive realism, and in some ways
it is. See infra Subsection II.B.1. As we explain more fully throughout the Article, though, the
reason why a court applies a particular rule makes an enormous difference. Thus, a directly
relevant state-court precedent is almost always controlling in the Erie context for a structural
reason—a state’s sovereign authority over the content of its law. Rare departures from this
rule do not obviate the overarching structural idea of controlling law.
44 On this understanding, there will sometimes be no controlling law. Consider, for example,
a diversity action in federal court. State law supplies the substantive rules of decision, but if
no state precedents are directly on point, then there is no controlling law (i.e., an authoritative
precedent that directly governs the case). Absent directly controlling precedent, a federal court
can make a so-called Erie guess as to what the state law is. See, e.g., Dolores K. Sloviter, A
Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 Va. L. Rev.
1671, 1676–81 (1992) (describing prevalence of Erie guesses).
45
For example, a judge in the District of Minnesota (in the Eighth Circuit) might find the
logic of a Seventh Circuit opinion to be well-reasoned and convincing.
46 See Barzun, supra note 33, at 1657–58; Caminker, supra note 33, at 850–51.
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those precedents are not absolutely binding on the Court itself.47 This, in
turn, means that the Supreme Court is never subject to controlling law.
What, then, does all of this have to do with settled law? Everything and
nothing.
Everything, because controlling law infuses (and often infects) most
popular and political discussions about whether law is or should be
settled. It also looms over most doctrinal applications of settled law.
Nothing, because controlling and settled law are distinct concepts and,
at most, only loosely connected. Settled law is more ethereal than
controlling law, as we explore in the next Part, and presents a much
different question: Irrespective of whether law is controlling in a
particular court, should the court nevertheless regard that law as
determinative? Answering this question does not turn on judicial
hierarchy, the structure of court systems, or the formal strength of any
court’s precedents. And this is the key distinction: controlling law is
determinative for a structural reason (such as judicial hierarchy or
because, say, a state’s highest court is the ultimate authority on the
meaning of state law), whereas settled law is determinative for a nonstructural reason.
Settled and controlling law thus occupy different domains. Although
most people tend to talk about the two ideas in the same breath—at times
explicitly, at times only implicitly—neither depends on the other, and
neither is a subset of the other.
Accordingly, law can be controlling without being settled. In fact, it is
a fairly common scenario, and the Supreme Court has articulated how
lower courts should handle one of its most confounding variants: “If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest
on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”48 As we have defined the
terms, the older precedent is controlling because it addresses the precise
factual scenario at issue, and a lower court therefore must treat the

47

See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 665 (1944)) (noting that the Court has “never felt constrained to follow precedent”
that is “unworkable or . . . badly reasoned”). Similarly, federal district courts never create
binding precedent. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011).
48
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see also
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (reaffirming the principle that courts of appeals
should follow cases which directly control).
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precedent as binding. At the same time, if subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have “eroded,”49 “called into question,”50 or “significantly
undermined”51 that precedent, it probably does not constitute settled
law.52
The converse of this situation is also possible—law can be settled, even
if it is not controlling. Such a state of affairs is admittedly much rarer. It
is also more intriguing, as we explore in Part III, because it reveals the
genuine independence of these concepts as well as the surreptitious ways
that conflating them can distort both doctrine and political rhetoric.53
II. DISAGGREGATING SETTLED LAW
Settled law, even unalloyed by the separate concept of controlling law,
embraces a dizzying panoply of ideas. Some jurists and commentators
will say that law is settled once the Supreme Court has squarely decided
an issue.54 Others contend that for law to be settled, something more—an
ineffable permanence—is necessary.55 This might stem from a cold
empirical prediction that a precedent is not in danger of reversal or from
a conviction that the law has achieved the “right” result.56
49

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997).
Kozel, supra note 34, at 203.
51 United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001).
52 Only “probably” because “settled law” is not a monolith, as we discuss in Part II, so
prudence cautions against broad pronouncements.
53 See, e.g., infra notes 230–37 and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 348, 348 (1832).
55 Indeed, many justify claims that a precedent is settled law by emphasizing the amount of
time that has elapsed since its issuance. See, e.g., Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
500, 514 (1873); Ho-Chunk, Inc. v. Sessions, 894 F.3d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Or. Rest.
& Lodging Ass’n v. Perez, 843 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 2016) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc); Becker, Moore & Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 74 F.2d 687, 688
(2d Cir. 1935). Although most recognize a precedent’s long tenure as a feature of it
constituting settled law, few would claim that age alone transforms a prior decision into settled
law. As Justice Holmes succinctly noted, “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” Holmes, supra note 27, at 469.
56 Focusing on entrenchment brings to mind the literature on “super precedent.” Definitions
of “super precedent” often have the ring of settled law from the descriptive realist perspective,
albeit with an extremely high degree of confidence that a court is unlikely to disturb a
particular precedent. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1204,
1206 (2006) (defining “super precedents” as decisions that are “so encrusted and deeply
embedded in constitutional law that they have become practically immune to reconsideration
and reversal”). But other definitions align more readily with the normative frameworks we
outline here. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A
Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1232, 1244 (2006) (“To be sure, some
50
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The inconsistencies become even more apparent in the political realm.
Advocacy groups frequently invoke settled law, but often to espouse
contradictory arguments. Sometimes those groups chastise nominees for
failing to endorse a decision as settled law,57 but at other times argue that
nominees should not be able to hide behind such a vacuous notion.58 At
the hearings themselves, a Senator might seek assurances from a nominee
that a particular precedent is settled, usually because the Senator suspects
that the nominee otherwise could be hostile to that precedent.59 And while
nominees gamely declare precedents to be “settled law,” one can infer
that they use the term in a very different way than their questioners.60
A unifying definition of settled law has eluded scholars, practitioners,
and judges,61 and we suggest that there is a straightforward reason why:
precedents could be super, in part, because they are constitutionally correct. I put Marbury,
Brown, and Griswold into this category.”); Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 363, 400 (2007) (“The change in socio-legal culture necessary for
Marbury no longer to suit our needs would be so great that we would no longer recognize it
as the United States.”).
“Settled law” and “super precedent” are not synonyms, but they often seem adjacent. Much
of the work that we do here to disaggregate the five different frameworks of settled law could
inform the conversation about “super precedent.”
57 NARAL Pro-Choice America criticized then-Judge Kavanaugh for “question[ing] Roe as
‘settled law.’” Press Release, NARAL Pro-Choice Am., New Hard-Hitting NARAL Ad
Shows the Future for Nevada Women if Heller Votes To Confirm Kavanaugh, Who Will Gut
Roe v. Wade and Criminalize Abortion (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/2018/09/12/kavanaugh-emails-show-he-will-gut-roe-2/ [https://perma.cc/XV6E-LKAE]. Similarly, the Human Rights Campaign argued that “[t]he Obergefell decision is settled
law” and criticized Kavanaugh because he “cannot so much as affirm that.” Press Release,
Human Rights Campaign, Kavanaugh’s Refusal To Answer Questions on Obergefell Is
Unacceptable, Threat to LGBTQ People (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.hrc.org/press/hrckavanaughs-refusal-to-answer-questions-on-obergefell-is-unacceptable [https://perma.cc/BR47-RQJH].
58 The National Rifle Association criticized Elena Kagan for “refus[ing] to state her support
for the Second Amendment, saying only that the matter was ‘settled law.’” Press Release,
NRA-ILA, Statement on Elena Kagan’s Confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court (Aug.
6, 2010), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20100806/statement-on-elena-kagans-confirmation
[https://perma.cc/8JZV-3NP3]. The day before criticizing Kavanaugh’s failure to endorse
Obergefell as “settled law,” the Human Rights Campaign’s President said nominees “should
not be allowed to hide behind” the non-answer that “something is ‘settled law.’” Ted Johnson,
Human Rights Campaign’s Chad Griffin on What Brett Kavanaugh Means for Same-Sex
Marriage, Variety (Sept. 5, 2018, 5:42 AM), https://variety.com/2018/politics/news/chadgriffin-human-rights-campaign-brett-kavanaugh-1202927377/ [https://perma.cc/PT6D-UUSU].
59 See infra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
60
See supra note 11.
61 See, e.g., Holmes v. FEC, 823 F.3d 69, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussing the difficulty of
identifying a precise definition for “settled law”); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of
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settled law lacks a universal meaning. The problem is not that legal actors
are all referring to the same concept with alarming imprecision. Rather,
settled law has become a repository for conceptually distinct and often
competing ideas.62 In some sense, these ideas all attempt to respond to a
common question—whether law is determinative for a non-structural
reason—but the answers lack any common attribute.
In this Part, we endeavor to bring clarity and precision to this debate
by disaggregating how people talk about settled law. We develop a
taxonomy that reflects a fundamental intuition about the difference
between descriptive and normative claims that law is settled. We then
flesh out that intuition with several dominant jurisprudential theories:
formalism, realism, and legal process theory. Thus, the taxonomy’s five
frameworks—(1) normative formalism, (2) descriptive formalism, (3)
descriptive realism, (4) normative realism, and (5) legal process—identify
the distinct ideas that the term settled law can convey.63

Takings Law, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1393, 1513 n.306 (1991) (“If . . . courts are permitted to treat
the possibility of legal change as part of settled law, it becomes increasingly difficult to
maintain the idea that anything is settled at all.”).
62 From a philosophical perspective, one might think about this problem in terms of the
concept-conception distinction. Walter Bryce Gallie first elucidated the idea of “essentially
contested concepts,” including such concepts as art and democracy, of which people might
have competing conceptions. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 Proc.
Aristotelian Soc’y 167, 168 (1956). A concept is essentially contested if there is a core
disagreement about the criteria for its application. Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an
Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 Law & Phil. 137, 149 (2002). For the reasons
that we explore in this Part, we believe that settled law is not a single concept, although we
don’t entirely agree with one another about which concepts (and conceptions thereof) that
settled law embraces. Moreover, we are mindful of Waldron’s criticism that legal scholars
have been less than careful—even profligate—when talking about the concept-conception
distinction. See id. at 148–49 (“[I]n the law review literature, the use of the term has run wild,
with ‘essentially contested’ meaning something like ‘very hotly contested, with no resolution
in sight.’ But in Gallie’s article, ‘essentially’ is not just an intensifier.”) At the very least,
though, this framing begins to elucidate why we are dealing with a more fundamental problem
than linguistic imprecision.
63 In developing a comprehensive taxonomy, we aspire to open a new dialogue about
“settled law.” On that front, Professor Lawrence Solum has offered constructive and insightful
comments about this project and, in turn, has suggested a complementary framework focused
on “open” and “contested” questions of law. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Open
and Contested Questions of Law (Oct. 4, 2020), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2020/10/legal-theory-lexicon-open-and-contested-questions-of-law.html [https://perma.cc/GNZ4-8Z85].
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A. The Formalist Frameworks
The first two categories in our taxonomy of settled law (normative
formalism and descriptive formalism) draw on the rich jurisprudential
tradition of legal formalism.64 The scholars and judges whose arguments
fit into these categories are not necessarily strict formalists themselves,
but their views of settled law largely turn on whether courts have reached
correct legal outcomes.65 Perhaps the most difficult question for jurists
who fit within this part of the taxonomy is whether a precedent that is
incorrect nevertheless can constitute settled law.66
Broadly stated, legal formalism is the belief that legal questions have
objectively correct answers.67 For the formalist, the law constitutes
something more than mere politics,68 and discerning the correct answer in
a case is emphatically not an exercise of raw judicial will. 69 Instead, law
is a complete, autonomous, and self-justifying system of logic.70
64

For an in-depth look at classic formalism, see Grey, supra note 24.
Ronald Dworkin’s interpretationalism, for example, differs greatly from the rigidity of
classic legal formalism. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 226 (1986) (recognizing that
“law as integrity” differs from “conventionalism”—i.e., formalism). Nevertheless, Dworkin’s
insistence that legal issues have discrete right answers is enough, for some, to situate him
within the formalist camp. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 Colum. L.
Rev. 1138, 1146 (1999) (reviewing Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Positivism in American
Jurisprudence (1998)); Mark C. Modak-Truran, Secularization, Legal Indeterminacy, and
Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 73, 101 (2007).
66 Blackstone took the extreme view that a former decision that “is manifestly absurd or
unjust” is not just “bad law” but rather “not law” at all. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*70. Most contemporary jurists and scholars endorse a more permissive approach.
67 Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting off the Formal for the
Function, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 1037, 1040 (1991) (“Legal Formalism is the traditional view that
correct legal decisions are determined by pre-existing legal precedent, and the courts must
reach their decisions solely based upon logical deduction, applying the facts of a particular
case to a set of pre-existing legal rules.”).
68 Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L.J.
949, 950 (1988) (“Everyone knows that legal formalism asserts the distinction of law and
politics.”). Indeed, for some formalists, even politically-charged constitutional questions are
deemed non-legal. See Grey, supra note 24, at 34 (“To the legal science mentality such openended questions were political, not legal, and the courts abandoned any scientific role in trying
to answer them.”). Some contemporary jurists still maintain that politics is divorced from law.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 687 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It can be
tempting for judges to confuse our own preferences with the requirements of the law.”).
69 Steven J. Heyman, Aristotle on Political Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 851, 851 (1992).
70 Swisher, supra note 67, at 1040; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist
Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging 1 (2010); Weinrib, supra note 68, at 951; see also C.C.
Langdell, Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, Preface to the First Edition, at viii (2d.
ed. Bos., Little, Brown, & Co. 1879) (describing law as a “science” and mastery of the law as
a practice of learning how to apply it with “constant facility and certainty”).
65

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

74

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:57

On this view, legal reasoning operates in a manner structurally
analogous to, say, geometry.71 Just as the core tenets of geometry are seen
“not merely [as] human constructs, but rather obvious and indubitable
physical truths about the structure of space, from which nonobvious truths
(like the Pythagorean theorem) can be proved by sequences of indubitable
deductive steps,”72 formalism treats the core tenets of law as equally
obvious and immutable.73 By carefully examining and deducing these
obvious and objective legal truths, one can discern the answer to all legal
questions.74 “[F]undamental principles of the common law were
discerned by induction from cases; rules of law were then derived from
principles conceptually; and finally, cases were decided, also
conceptually, from rules.”75
For the legal formalist, then, law is an internal system—a
comprehensive framework of rules and principles that serve as the
exclusive reference point for discerning all legal truths. 76 In this way,
formalism stands in stark contrast to those legal philosophies, such as
71

Grey, supra note 24, at 16.
Id. at 17.
73 Lucille A. Jewel, Silencing Discipline in Legal Education, 49 U. Tol. L. Rev. 657, 660
(2018) (“Legal formalism was most certainly inspired by enlightenment principles
emphasizing objectivity, reason, and competition.”); Shai Lavi, Turning the Tables on “Law
and . . .”: A Jurisprudential Inquiry into Contemporary Legal Theory, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 811,
825–26 (2011) (“[A] good example of a legal theory that views law itself as science is legal
formalism. Its underlying presupposition is that law has the structure of reason.”).
74 Grey, supra note 24, at 16; see also Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1983 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[C]ommon-law judges were tasked with identifying and applying
objective principles of law—discerned from natural reason, custom, and other external
sources—to particular cases.”).
75 Grey, supra note 24, at 19. Formalism is therefore seen as embracing something of a topdown approach. Concerns of justice, efficiency, and even social legitimacy are only relevant
insofar as they are embedded within higher-order principles. The legal formalist must “identify
the most abstract unifying conceptions implicit in the law’s doctrinal and institutional
arrangements, and . . . enquire into the rationality that inheres in the law’s processes.” Lavi,
supra note 73, at 825–26 (quoting Ernest J. Weinrib, Private Law and Public Right, 61 U.
Toronto L.J. 191, 193 (2011)).
76 Grey, supra note 24, at 11 (“[T]he heart of classical theory was its aspiration that the legal
system be made complete through universal formality, and universally formal through
conceptual order. A few basic top-level categories and principles formed a conceptually
ordered system above a large number of bottom-level rules. The rules themselves were,
ideally, the holdings of established precedents, which upon analysis could be seen to be
derivable from the principles.”). As articulated by Harvard Law School dean Christopher
Langdell, “Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have
such mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to the
ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer . . . .” Langdell, supra
note 70, at viii.
72
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realism, that expressly take account of the on-the-ground consequences
of a particular legal conclusion.77 This is true even when the (formally)
correct legal answer in a case may “cause great hardship and practical
injustice” or give rise to a temptation to pursue “ingenious attempts” to
reach a desired outcome.78 But giving in to that temptation would violate
the requirement of conceptual order on which the formality and logical
structure of the legal system depend.79 If law is to be a science, as the
formalists contend, correct legal answers must derive from higher-order
principles, regardless of the positive or negative externalities that a
particular legal decision might bring.
1. Normative Formalism
From a formalist perspective, determining what should constitute
settled law is relatively straightforward. Law is settled when a court has
reached the right result.80 More specifically, normative formalism’s belief
in the completeness of law means that any metric for assessing whether a
decision was right or wrong must be based on law’s internal logic.81
Modern normative formalism differs substantially from its earliest
antecedents. The early common law was infused with natural law
77 Marcus J. Curtis, Realism Revisited: Reaffirming the Centrality of the New Deal in
Realist Jurisprudence, 27 Yale J.L. & Human. 157, 164 (2015); Richard D. Schwartz,
Reviews, 65 Yale L.J. 572, 577 (1956) (reviewing Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism,
Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind (1955)).
78 Grey, supra note 24, at 15 (quoting C.C. Langdell, Summary on the Law of Contracts 4
(2d ed. Bos., Little, Brown, & Co. 1880)); see also J. Skelly Wright, Law and the Logic of
Experience: Reflections on Denning, Devlin, and Judicial Innovation in the British Context,
33 Stan. L. Rev. 179, 184 (1980) (reviewing Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law
(1979)) (discussing legal formalism’s rejection of developments in tort and contract law that
sought to “temper ancient rigidities” or better reflect “modern realities”).
79 Heyman, supra note 69, at 851 (“Legal justification involves the working out of principles
that are immanent in the law, rather than looking to the instrumental realm of politics.”); see
also Grey, supra note 24, at 15 (arguing that the need to justify the scientific nature of law
explains the primacy of formalism in classical legal thought).
80 Formalists do acknowledge the possibility that judges can get the law wrong. Stephen A.
Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 Iowa L. Rev.
1513, 1522 (2001); see also James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law 444 (N.Y., O.
Halstead 1826) (mentioning the thousands of cases in English and American law that have
been overruled or otherwise doubted or limited). This recognition, in turn, gives rise to tension
surrounding a formalist’s adherence to stare decisis. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
81 See Grey, supra note 24, at 6–8; Richard Posner, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal
Realism, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 326, 329 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in
Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated
Rights, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155, 163 (2006).
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theory,82 and, until the late nineteenth century, courts “were thought to
discover rather than to make the rules and principles that they applied.”83
Immutable legal principles, discerned from both reason and divine law,
offered a rule of decision in every case.84 A judge’s role was simply to
reveal those legal principles and pinpoint their appropriate application
without distortion. By contrast, judges today look for rules of decision in
positive law—such as the Constitution, statutes, and regulations—rather
than a general common law.85 But normative formalism is far from dead.
Instead, the same motivation that drove common law judges—the search
for immutable legal truths—characterizes the modern formalist approach
to interpreting, construing, and applying those texts.86
In the context of settled law, modern normative formalism is capacious.
It encompasses all approaches that purport to measure the correctness of
judicial opinions using an internal logic. For illustrative purposes, though,
modern originalism offers a uniquely helpful example, in large part
because it makes clear claims about its internal metric and how one should
determine a correct result.87 Moreover, several prominent originalists
Weinrib, supra note 68, at 954 n.14 (“[L]egal formalism . . . has been understood in the
philosophic tradition of natural law and natural right and as it is presupposed in the ideal of
coherence to which sophisticated legal systems aspire.”). Legal reasoning was not an exercise
in policymaking; rather, it involved discovering truths from “the application of the dictates of
natural justice, and of cultivated reason, to particular cases” and required reference to both
principles of reason and divine law. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous
Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 44–45 (2001) (quoting 1 James Kent, Commentaries on
American Law 439 (N.Y., O. Halstead 1826)). James Kent, for example, declared that the
basis of law was a form of “natural justice” or “natural reason.” See John H. Langbein,
Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 547, 569 (1993)
(quoting 1 Kent, Commentaries, supra, at 439).
83 Nelson, supra note 82, at 23 (emphasis removed); see also David T. Watters, Retroactivity
Refused: North Carolina Defies Supreme Court Precedent in Swanson v. State, 70 N.C. L.
Rev. 2125, 2132 (1992) (“Early common law was based upon Blackstone’s concept of natural
law, which allowed judges only to ‘declare’ a law from a pre-existing body of law.”).
84 See 3 G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–35, at 129
(1988).
85 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Federal
courts today look to different sources of law when exercising the judicial power than did the
common-law courts of England.”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There
is no federal general common law.”).
86 Posner, supra note 81, at 329 (“What I described earlier as legal formalism in the common
law sphere resembles certain approaches to interpretation, such as textualism and
intentionalism, in that they assign a modest role to the judge, that of translator or logical
manipulator, rather than that of a policy analyst.”).
87 Barrett, supra note 25, at 1921 (“For an originalist, the meaning of the text is fixed so long
as it is discoverable.”).
82
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grapple with the problem of whether an incorrect result can ever attain the
status of settled law.88
For an originalist, properly interpreting a constitutional provision
requires a judge to excavate and apply that provision’s public meaning
from the time of its drafting and enactment. “Originalism maintains both
that constitutional text means what it did at the time it was ratified and
that this original public meaning is authoritative.” 89 Consistent with
modern formalism, this interpretive approach eschews taking account of
the external consequences of a particular interpretation.90 This is also true
of the plain-meaning textualist approach to statutory interpretation, a
kissing cousin of constitutional originalism.91 Both espouse the idea that
there is a correct answer to what a text means and how it should apply to
a given case. Thus, a judge’s role, within this modern normative formalist
framework, is simply to call “balls and strikes.”92
As with classic formalism, both the originalist and plain-meaning
textualist strive for the objectively correct answer to legal questions.93 But
this will be true of anyone who subscribes to the idea that at least certain
legal questions have correct answers. So, someone committed to an
intentionalist statutory interpretation methodology might consult a broad
array of authorities, including not just text and structure but also a
statute’s legislative history, to arrive at what she regards as the single best
interpretation.94 In a similar vein, one might think of Ronald Dworkin’s

88 For example, in the next Section, we explore the opinions of Justices Clarence Thomas,
Antonin Scalia, Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch, and Samuel Alito on this issue. See infra
Subsection II.A.2.
89 Barrett, supra note 25, at 1921.
90 Consider, for example, Chief Justice John Roberts’s dissenting opinion in Obergefell v.
Hodges, which claims to eschew consequentialist politics. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
644, 687 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
91 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash.
U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994) (“The textualist judge treats questions of interpretation like a puzzle
to which it is assumed there is one right answer.”); see also Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and
Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 46 (2006) (“[A]ggressive textualists purport to use
textualist interpretive tools not just to resolve statutory ambiguity but to eliminate it.”).
92 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005)
(statement of Roberts, J.).
93 Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1, 49 (2007).
94 See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 353–54 (2005); see also
Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation,
69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 309, 366 (2001) (explaining that “taking background principles as the
guide” gives courts flexibility to interpret a statute using more than just its text).
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interpretationalist framework of “law as integrity,”95 which purports to
offer a means of discerning the single right answer to a legal question
through a balancing of “fit” and “best light.”96 Few would consider
Dworkin’s jurisprudential theory akin to staunch formalism. But his
insistence that objectively correct legal answers exist situates his theory
proximate to (if not squarely within) the normative formalist account of
settled law.97 And, as we show in Part III, when political actors across the
ideological spectrum assert that a particular legal question is settled, they
frequently place themselves within the normative formalist paradigm—
claiming that a precedent achieved the right result and thus should be
deemed settled.
In a perfect world, why shouldn’t someone who believes in correct
answers insist that only those answers truly settle the law? Justice Thomas
has been one of the most ardent defenders of this particular conception of
settled law.98 Although he has developed these arguments in the context
of constitutional originalism, they apply far more broadly to any theory
predicated on objectively correct answers. Courts, he contends, should
“‘examin[e] without fear, and revis[e] without reluctance,’ any ‘hasty and
crude decisions’ rather than leaving ‘the character of [the] law impaired,
and the beauty and harmony of the system destroyed by the perpetuity of
error.’”99
2. Descriptive Formalism
Despite its lofty normative aspirations, formalism faces a dilemma
when it comes to describing existing law as settled. Is someone who
95

Dworkin, supra note 65, at 225–28.
Ofer Raban, Dworkin’s “Best Light” Requirement and the Proper Methodology of Legal
Theory, 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 243, 245–47 (2003) (citing Dworkin, supra note 65, at 53,
66 and describing the canonical interpretation of Dworkin’s theory in terms of “fit” and “best
light”).
97 See Leiter, supra note 65, at 1146 (suggesting that Dworkin “remains within the formalist
camp because he sees the law as rationally determinate”); Modak-Truran, supra note 65, at
101 (describing Dworkin’s interpretative theory as a “weak legal formalism”).
98 See Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1996) (“My vision of the process
of judging is unabashedly based on the proposition that there are right and wrong answers to
legal questions.”); see also, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 945 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“I cannot subscribe to the view that in our decisions under the
Voting Rights Act it is more important that we have a settled rule than that we have the right
rule.”).
99 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
1 Kent, Commentaries, supra note 80, at 444).
96
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believes in objectively correct answers to legal questions committed to
the idea that only those correct answers truly settle a legal question? Or,
to put the question the other way around, can an objectively incorrect
decision ever constitute settled law as a purely descriptive matter?
If a court has reached what a formalist believes is the correct result,
there is no tension. A formalist would contend that, in light of such a
result, the law both should be settled and, in fact, is settled.100
The difficulty arises when the formalist must determine whether an
incorrect decision, especially one that a court has repeatedly reaffirmed,
can eventually settle a legal question.101 At its core, the descriptive
formalist account of settled law raises the basic problem of horizontal
stare decisis—the binding effect that a court ascribes to its own
decisions.102 As a structural matter, a court always has latitude to correct
its earlier erroneous decisions.103 But absent extraordinary circumstances,
which we discuss in a moment, stare decisis calls on courts to abide by
their earlier pronouncements.104 This deference to previous decisions does
not derive from a hierarchal mandate that inferior courts must obey the
controlling decisions of superior courts.105 Nor does stare decisis rest on
any assurance that the first decision was correct.106 Rather, it admonishes

To borrow the words of Justice Brandeis, here the law wouldn’t simply be “settled” but
“settled right.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
101 See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It
Sounds, 22 Const. Comment. 257, 261 (2005) (“How and when precedent should be rejected
remains one of the great unresolved controversies of jurisprudence.”); Siegel, supra note 80,
at 1522 (“How courts would treat ‘incorrect’ precedent—extend it, confine it, ignore it, or
even overrule it—forever ‘compromis[ed] the classical . . . aspiration toward universally
formal conceptual order’ and substantially broke the analogy between legal and natural
science.” (quoting Grey, supra note 24, at 26)); see also Kozel, supra note 25, at 1846 (noting
that “multiple perspectives commonly emerge within interpretive schools as the result of
varying normative premises”).
102 Giving “prior judicial decisions the weight that those decisions carry independently of
any formal requirement that precedent be followed” is what Professor Larry Alexander
helpfully calls the “natural model” of precedent. Alexander, supra note 33, at 5.
103 Albeit not with respect to the incorrect decision itself, but in terms of announcing the
correct rule that will apply in the future.
104 See United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399–400 (1973).
105 See supra Part I.
106 See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (“Respecting stare decisis
means sticking to some wrong decisions.”); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2423 (2019)
(“Of course, it is good—and important—for our opinions to be right and well-reasoned. But
that is not the test for overturning precedent.”).
100
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courts to respect and adhere to their own (non-controlling) precedent
simply because of the precedent’s existence.107
But for the formalist, why would a court ever choose to entrench a
demonstrably (or even arguably) erroneous precedent rather than fix it?108
More specifically, why should legal actors prefer the acknowledged
imperfections of precedential rules rather than a case-by-case approach
that admonishes courts simply to “get it right”? After all, a rule of
precedent and, relatedly, stare decisis inevitably will lead courts to reach
suboptimal results in certain cases.109
A rich literature has grappled with the formalist’s dilemma.110 Scholars
have offered careful and incisive answers, the most persuasive of which
emphasize, as an initial matter, that precedential decision making
encourages a more coherent legal system by managing the inherent
fallibility and limited capacity of human beings.111 Thus, the first step in
resolving the dilemma lies in recognizing that despite the rigidity of the
law’s logical structure, the perfect shouldn’t become the enemy of the
good. A rule of precedent might lead to suboptimal results in some
individual cases, but in a world of finite resources, it can achieve greater
systemic accuracy as well as a more legitimate and coherent legal

107 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 265–66 (1986)).
108 See Alexander, supra note 33, at 4 (describing the problem of precedent as “constraint
by incorrectly decided precedents”); Schauer, supra note 33, at 589–91 (arguing that
precedential decision making will often lead to suboptimal decisions in any given case).
109 “If one has a theory of stare decisis that permits precedent decisions to have genuine
decision-altering weight—that is, if precedents dictate different results than the interpreter
otherwise would reach in the absence of such precedents—then stare decisis corrupts the
otherwise ‘pure’ constitutional decision-making process.” Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 Const. Comment. 289, 290 (2005); see also
Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 847, 864 (1987)
(reviewing Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986)) (“[A] regime of rules, even if followed
faithfully and inexorably, will generate some number of wrong answers . . . .”); Randy J.
Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 789, 832 (2017) (“If a prior
decision drastically interferes with individual liberty or the proper operation of the
government, it seems natural that deference should yield.”).
110 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 25, at 1922–29; Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle,
Congressional Originalism, 19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 15–16 (2016); Thomas B. Colby & Peter
J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239, 260 (2009); Kozel, supra note 25, at 1865–
66; Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 105, 108
(2015); Monaghan, supra note 33, at 739–48; Paulsen, supra note 109, at 289.
111
See Alexander, supra note 33, at 49 (arguing that “adherence to rules even when the rules
dictate incorrect results—as they inevitably will in some cases—may achieve more value and
thus be more ‘correct’ than deciding each individual case ‘correctly’”).
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system.112 Stare decisis, even when it entrenches an incorrect decision,
can promote judicial economy, the rule of law, fairness, predictability,
reliance, and stability—all higher-order principles that formalists
value.113 Most formalists recognize that vindicating these principles is
also part of a court’s duty to get the “right” result.114 But simply
recognizing the abstract value of stare decisis does not solve the problem.
The second and far more difficult step in resolving the dilemma entails
discerning when the considerations that animate stare decisis are
paramount. This requires a delicate balancing act.115 Most formalists will
recognize that, in some cases, the benefits of these higher-order principles
outweigh the costs of correctly answering a specific legal question.116
Stare decisis never applies automatically, however, meaning that there is
no consensus about its scope or strength.117
Here, there is deep disagreement among judges and scholars. We need
not resolve that debate, even if doing so were possible; rather, we seek
only to identify the factors that can lead someone to accept that the

112 Indeed, if judges were to approach each case as a matter of first impression,
unencumbered by precedent’s tug, they would become overburdened and likely would give
short shrift to each individual case. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process 149 (1921). Precedent, then, is a heuristic device. It might not lead to the ideal result
in every individual case, but it can foster more efficient decision making and produce better
system-wide results. Perhaps paradoxically, a rule of precedent, despite its known
deficiencies, can lead to better results than a regime that aspires to achieve the best result on
a case-by-case basis. See Alexander, supra note 33, at 49; Schauer, supra note 33, at 595–602;
Solum, supra note 29, at 247; Trammell, supra note 36, at 601–06. The formalist internalizes
these features as contributing to the coherence and acceptability of the legal system. See Grey,
supra note 24, at 8–11.
113 See John Ferejohn, Law, Legislation, and Positive Political Theory, in Modern Political
Economy: Old Topics, New Directions 191, 194 (Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Hanushek eds.,
1995) (noting that formalism values “consistency, coherence, and stability” and disfavors
“external political or economic forces”); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of
Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1173, 1188 (2006) (“On a deeper level, rejection of stare decisis
presents a theoretical conundrum for originalism . . . originalism in practice is linked with a
type of formalism that celebrates the value of clear rules.”).
114 For examples demonstrating how adherence to stare decisis can constitute the “right”
outcome for a formalist, see Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse
Stare Decisis, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1437, 1473–77 (2007); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Text, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2011).
115 See Schauer, supra note 33, at 595–602.
116 See, e.g., Lash, supra note 114, at 1473–77; Mitchell, supra note 114, at 2.
117 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy
and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision . . . .”); see also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982–83 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that stare decisis has no force if the earlier decision was “plainly wrong”).
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principles of stare decisis take precedence over reaching a correct result,
such that a wrong legal result can, descriptively, constitute settled law.
Different formalists can and do weigh these higher-order principles
differently. As with the normative formalist approach to settled law,
originalism is illustrative, revealing a fierce internal debate about when
the principles of stare decisis prevail and, critically, whether they
meaningfully settle the law.118
On one end of the spectrum, some originalist scholars have argued that
concerns about reliance, stability, and predictability can never trump a
proper interpretation of the Constitution.119 At least in the realm of
constitutional adjudication, fidelity to the Constitution itself leaves no
room to entrench wrong results, no matter the costs. Justice Thomas’s
recent concurring opinion in Gamble v. United States120 best exemplifies
this view, which prioritizes right answers above all else: “When faced
with a demonstrably erroneous precedent, my rule is simple: We should
not follow it.”121 For Justice Thomas and other like-minded originalists,
incorrect precedents can never constitute settled law, even as a descriptive
matter.122 To them, stare decisis does not foster higher-order principles;
instead “the Court’s stare decisis doctrine [merely gives] the veneer of
respectability to our continued application of demonstrably incorrect
precedents.”123
Other originalists, however, do not recognize the absolute preeminence
of right answers.124 Justice Scalia was fond of saying, “I am an originalist;
118

See Barrett, supra note 25, at 1922–29; Barrett & Nagle, supra note 110, at 15–16; Colby
& Smith, supra note 110, at 260; Kozel, supra note 25, at 1865–66; Kozel, supra note 110, at
108; Monaghan, supra note 33, at 724; Paulsen, supra note 109, at 289.
119 Barnett, supra note 56, at 1233 (“‘[F]earless originalists’ . . . reject the doctrine of stare
decisis in the following sense: if a prior decision of the Supreme Court is in conflict with the
original meaning of the text of the Constitution, it is the Constitution and not precedent that
binds present and future Justices.”); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent,
17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 23, 24 (1994) (“[T]he practice of following precedent is not merely
nonobligatory or a bad idea; it is affirmatively inconsistent with the federal Constitution.”);
Paulsen, supra note 109, at 289 (“Whatever one’s theory of constitutional interpretation, a
theory of stare decisis, poured on top and mixed in with it, always corrupts the original
theory.”).
120 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
121 Id. at 1984 (Thomas, J., concurring).
122 See Barnett, supra note 56, at 1233; Lawson, supra note 119, at 24; Paulsen, supra note
109, at 289.
123
Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring).
124 On this point, see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 412 (2012), for Justice Scalia’s views on stare decisis. See also P. Thomas
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I am not a nut.”125 This was his acknowledgment of the obvious fact that
judges decide cases in the real world, not the seminar room.126
“Originalism,” he wrote, “like any other theory of interpretation put into
practice in an ongoing system of law, must accommodate the doctrine of
stare decisis; it cannot remake the world anew.”127 Although Justice
Scalia regarded his commitment to stare decisis as an exception to
originalism,128 Justice Barrett has defended it as compatible with an
originalist framework.129 That is, Justice Barrett insists that Justice
Scalia’s approach to stare decisis largely accords with originalist thought
because, often, stare decisis does not require judges to consider the
validity of past decisional theories, but only to adhere to past results.130
Notwithstanding this difference in framing, she has defended stare
decisis, as did Justice Scalia, as “a sensible rule” that “protects the
reliance interests of those who have structured their affairs in accordance
with the Court’s existing cases.”131 Moreover, most of the avowedly
originalist justices currently serving on the Supreme Court share the view
that, as a descriptive matter, even imperfect precedent can constitute
settled law.132
DiStanislao III, The Highest Court: A Dialogue Between Justice Louis Brandeis and Justice
Antonin Scalia on Stare Decisis, 51 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1149, 1171 (2017) (noting Justice
Scalia’s inconsistent calls for “a weaker view of stare decisis in nonoriginalist constitutional
interpretation in some cases, but not in others”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 Cin. L. Rev. 849, 861 (1989) (“In its undiluted form, at least, [originalism] is medicine that
seems too strong to swallow.”).
125 Antonin G. Scalia, A Look Back: 1994 William O. Douglas Lecture Series Transcript,
51 Gonz. L. Rev. 583, 588 (2016).
126 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Essay, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and
Related Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 726 (2012) (“Constitutions are not forged in seminar
rooms.”).
127 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 138–39 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
128 See James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and
Minimalism, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1623, 1631 (2006) (reviewing Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty:
Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (2005) and Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes:
Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for America (2005)) (quoting Scalia, supra note
127, at 140).
129 Barrett, supra note 25, at 1922–23.
130 Id. at 1939 (“Adhering to a nonoriginalist decisional theory poses a different and more
theoretically difficult issue for the originalist than does simply leaving the result of a decision
in place.”).
131 Id. at 1921.
132
Justice Neil Gorsuch, for example, has insisted that stare decisis “warrants respect” and
should only be abandoned when the principles it purports to advance, including stability and
reliance interests, are almost entirely inapplicable given severe deficiencies in the earlier
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The debate within originalist circles is only illustrative of the unique
tension that all formalists must navigate in descriptively declaring a
wrong decision settled law.133 Anyone who believes in objectively correct
answers to legal questions ultimately has to navigate this dilemma.
Declaring bad precedent settled law requires recognition of and
commitment to higher-order formalist principles, principles that might
run counter to the formalist commitment to decisional perfection. It
requires a theoretical weighing that largely plays out above the
particularities of any one case. But with few exceptions, most formalists
recognize instances when the law’s commitment to coherence, stability,
acceptability, and predictability warrant adherence to the status quo.134
That is, the formalist can faithfully assert that, descriptively, the wrong
decision is settled law.
B. The Realist Frameworks
The third and fourth frameworks of settled law derive from legal realist
jurisprudence. Realism rejects formalism’s key tenets, including, most
importantly for our purposes, the axiom that law has a guiding internal
logic. Instead, realism posits that the correctness of any particular
decision depends not only on some internal metric but also a decision’s
external consequences.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of the progenitors of the legal realist
school, saw realism as a critical response to formalism’s claim that legal
answers logically and necessarily derive from some higher-order system
decision. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 2006 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019)). Justice Samuel
Alito’s formalism strikes a similar chord. Given stare decisis’s role in advancing high-order
legal goals—in “promot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process”—Justice Alito has concluded that taking whatever
steps necessary to get to the right legal answer is not the end-all-be-all of judicial decision
making. Id. at 1969 (majority opinion) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827
(1991)). He wrote, “Of course, it is . . . important to be right, especially on constitutional
matters, where Congress cannot override our errors by ordinary legislation. But even in
constitutional cases, a departure from precedent ‘demands special justification.’” Id. (quoting
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
133 Notably, non-formalists do not place equivalent value on objectively correct answers to
legal questions and, therefore, adhering to stare decisis is less analytically taxing. See Kisor
v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2423 (2019) (majority opinion) (authored by Justice Kagan, who
is not generally regarded as a formalist).
134 Scalia, supra note 124, at 861 (“[A]lmost every originalist would adulterate [originalism]
with the doctrine of stare decisis.”).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Settled Law

85

of fundamental principles.135 Realists instead insist that legal systems are
composed of nothing more than “ill-disguised inconsistency.”136 So, in
their view, trying to divine objectively correct answers to legal questions
by mechanically applying authoritative doctrine to facts is, in Felix
Cohen’s evocative phrase, “transcendental nonsense.”137
Having abandoned the conception of law as a formal logical system,
legal realists instead advocate an external perspective and consider law’s
instrumental potential.138 This approach expressly imports external
metrics into the analysis and focuses on the normative tradeoffs within
any potential case outcome.139 Thus, realists often embrace an interdisciplinary approach.140 For instance, prominent scholars have argued
Holmes, supra note 27, at 460–61 (“What constitutes the law? You will find some text
writers telling you . . . that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from principles of
ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not coincide with the
decisions. . . . [But the] prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”); William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping
of Modern Antitrust, 44 Emory L.J. 1, 10 (1995) (“Holmes was one of the intellectual forbears
of realism and a frequent critic of the Court’s formalism and conceptualism.”).
136 Karl Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America 45 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi
trans., U. Chi. Press 1989) (1933).
137 See Cohen, supra note 28, at 811; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common
Law 3 (Harv. Univ. Press 2009) (1881) (“The law embodies the story of a nation’s
development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”).
138 See Schwartz, supra note 77, at 577 (noting that proponents of legal realism “call for
decisions made consciously in terms of social consequences”); Curtis, supra note 77, at 164
(“The second core feature of legal realism was a belief that questions of law should be resolved
with a view to the social consequences that would flow from a particular ruling.”); Hamish
Stewart, Contingency and Coherence: The Interdependence of Realism and Formalism in
Legal Theory, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995) (“Realism is the tendency to understand law
from without, that is, to explain law as a vehicle for achieving purposes that are external to
the law.”).
139 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, in Collected Legal
Papers 210, 238 (1921) [hereinafter Holmes, Law in Science] (“[T]he real justification of a
rule of law, if there be one, is that it helps to bring about a social end which we desire.”);
Holmes, supra note 27, at 474 (encouraging legal reasoning that focuses on “the ends sought
to be attained and the reasons for desiring them”); Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim,
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 Colum. L.
Rev. 1150, 1155 (2004).
140 Pound (1912), supra note 28, at 510 (“Not a little of the world-wide discontent with our
present legal order is due to modes of juristic thought and juridical method which result from
want of ‘team-work’ between jurisprudence and the other social sciences.”); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and
Economics, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 805, 854 (2000) (“Legal Realism is notable for its numerous
interdisciplinary outreaches in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science.”).
135
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that courts should use social sciences to evaluate “the actual social effects
of legal institutions and legal doctrines”141 and should explicitly take
human values, desires, and motivations into account when deciding
cases.142 Ultimately, realism is an unapologetically consequentialist
school of thought, as Holmes pithily expressed in one of his most famous
aphorisms: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”143
Legal realism’s core claim of legal indeterminacy does not mean that
law is perpetually unsettled.144 From a descriptive perspective, this is easy
enough to appreciate precisely because of realism’s consequentialist
moorings—law is settled when a court has indicated that it will abide by
an earlier decision. And even though realism rejects the idea of
objectively correct legal answers, one can also make a normative realist
claim about when law should be considered rightly decided and therefore
settled. Unlike in the formalist context, though, this normative perspective
measures a precedent through external metrics and benchmarks.
1. Descriptive Realism
The descriptive realist framework determines whether law is settled by
asking a simple question: Is there a material risk that a court will overturn
a prior decision? Stated more elegantly, the descriptive realist assessment
of settled law is effectively an exercise in Holmesian prediction theory
that “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious,” is the law.145 On this view, law depends on neither morality
nor logic but only on a practical, externally-facing assessment of how
courts will decide a case.146 Holmes’s “bad man” helps illustrate this

141

Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 212 (1921).
See Felix S. Cohen, Modern Ethics and the Law, in The Legal Conscience: Selected
Papers of Felix S. Cohen 17, 31–32 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960).
143 Holmes, supra note 137, at 1.
144 See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 56, at 389 (noting that even skeptical realists would likely
consider Marbury v. Madison “super-precedent” because it “accords with the realists’
philosophy”).
145 Holmes, supra note 27, at 461; see also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,
41 Stan. L. Rev. 787, 826 (1989) (“Holmes’ . . . statement that ‘[t]he prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law’ . . . has come
to be enshrined in the orthodox jurisprudence textbooks as ‘the prediction theory.’”).
146
William P. LaPiana, Victorian from Beacon Hill: Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Early Legal
Scholarship, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 817 (1990); David E. Van Zandt, The Relevance of Social
Theory to Legal Theory, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 10, 16 (1989).
142
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point.147 Imagine that a spouse wishes to secretly withdraw all money
from a joint bank account and gamble with it at a casino. Is there a legal
duty for the spouse to refrain from this behavior? The bad man is
unconcerned with higher order principles of equity, morality, and
justice;148 instead, he recognizes a legal duty only as “a prophecy that if
he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences
by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment.”149
The same reasoning is at work when a realist considers whether the law
is settled. Rather than looking to higher-order principles to determine if a
court correctly resolved a particular legal issue, the realist will define
settled law descriptively as a confident prophecy that, if she brings a new
lawsuit challenging an earlier decision, courts will uphold that earlier
precedent.150 That is, the realist will deem law settled based on a practical
assessment of whether a court will overrule an earlier decision.
Note that this framework is unconcerned with whether a decision has
reached a right or wrong result and focuses simply on whether a court will
depart from precedent. So, a realist can recognize that law is descriptively
settled even if she disagrees with the entrenched decision.
A few examples help illustrate the point. At one extreme, few would
have difficulty predicting that the Supreme Court will continue to uphold
seminal cases like Marbury v. Madison151 or Brown v. Board of
Education.152 Marbury of course enshrined judicial review as a bedrock
principle within the constitutional scheme;153 Brown (aspirationally)
Holmes, supra note 27, at 459 (“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must
look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”); see also John Harrison,
Richard Epstein’s Big Picture, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 837, 844 (1996) (reviewing Richard A.
Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (1995)) (“The bad man sees the law not as a set
of rules but as a list of prices . . . .”).
148 Holmes, supra note 27, at 460–61 (“[I]f we take the view of our friend the bad man we
shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want
to know what the . . . courts are likely to do in fact.”).
149 Id. at 461.
150 And as noted, realists will recognize that courts often adhere to precedent for
instrumental reasons. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 37–38 (1993); Richard A. Posner,
The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 881–82 (1988).
151 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
152
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
153 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177–78; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the
Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 Calif. L.
147

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

88

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:57

declared an end to school segregation and now ranks among the most
venerated Supreme Court decisions.154 There is no reasonable basis for
believing that the Supreme Court will uproot these decisions in the near,
or even distant, future; therefore, the realist could comfortably describe
these decisions as settled law.155
Other cases prove more difficult. Take, for example, Roe v. Wade156 or
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.157 Many today revere
Roe and its progeny158 as foundational for women’s rights and, in
particular, reproductive freedom.159 Roe’s supporters insist that Justice
Blackmun’s majority opinion, which affirmed a woman’s constitutional
right to an abortion, assuredly reached the correct result.160 But this is not
what determines whether Roe (and Casey) are settled under the
descriptive realist framework. Instead, the framework asks whether the
abortion decisions are immune to any reasonable threat of formal or
functional reversal by courts, and, on this score, despite the impassioned
support that those decisions continue to inspire, they almost assuredly fall
short. For decades, conservative politicians, thinktanks, and legal
societies have argued that the Court should overrule Roe and Casey.161
Rev. 1, 4 (2003) (“If viewed as the case establishing judicial review, Marbury has a
foundational, even constitutive role in constitutional jurisprudence. Take away Marbury, and
constitutional doctrine as we know it would disappear.”).
154 See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the
Struggle for Racial Equality, at vii (2004).
155 Even Justice Scalia, during his confirmation hearing, acknowledged the impracticability
of overruling Marbury: “As I say, Marbury v. Madison is one of the pillars of the
Constitution.” Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 33
(1986) (statement of Scalia, J.).
156 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
157 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
158 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 873 (1992) (upholding
the central tenets of Roe while refining its analytical framework).
159 Richard S. Myers, Re-Reading Roe v. Wade, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1025, 1026 (2014).
160 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 Yale L.J. 1694, 1706 (2008) (noting that “Roe’s
supporters believe the abortion right vindicates” certain “autonomy and equality values”);
Myers, supra note 159, at 1026 (“Roe has become a symbol—it was a great victory for
women’s rights, it was an important part of a cultural transformation . . . .”).
161 Most members of the Federalist Society and Heritage Foundation (two prominent
conservative organizations) are unpersuaded by the Court’s reasoning in Roe and Casey. See,
e.g., Jason Zengerle, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts, N.Y. Times
Mag. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2nZlAXX [https://perma.cc/T7EN-AK34] (“Many of
the group’s members question the legal basis for Roe v. Wade and whether a right to privacy
exists in the Constitution, as Roe held it does.”). Conservative thinker Ed Whelan, for
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Current and former Supreme Court Justices have hardly been circumspect
in voicing their opposition to the decisions,162 and scholars and advocacy
groups have warned that the Court is primed to vitiate those decisions.163
Sensing opportunity, conservative states have begun passing restrictive
abortion measures, which officials in those states acknowledge violate
Roe and Casey, in an attempt to tee up the abortion issue anew for the
Court.164 In such circumstances, predicting that the current Supreme
Court will continue to uphold the central tenets of Roe and Casey seems
less certain than in past decades.165 Accordingly, from the descriptive
realist perspective, those cases are probably not settled.
The same is overwhelmingly true of Citizens United. In 2010, the
Supreme Court held that government restrictions on corporate
expenditures for political messaging violated the First Amendment.166
Since then, many conservatives have lauded the decision for vindicating
seminal free speech principles.167 As with Roe, though, enthusiasm and
example, described Federalist Society head Leonard Leo as “more dedicated to the enterprise
of building a Supreme Court that will overturn Roe v. Wade” than any other conservative. Ed
Whelan, Mistaken Attack by Andy Schlafly on Leonard Leo, Nat’l Rev. (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/schlafly-attack-leonard-leo/ [https://perma.cc/LE5W-SM8E]. Responding to a presidential debate question as to whether he wants to
appoint justices willing to overturn Roe, then-candidate Donald Trump said, “I will say this:
It will go back to the states, and the states will then make a determination.” Aaron Blake, The
Final Trump-Clinton Debate Transcript, Annotated, Wash. Post (Oct. 19, 2016, 10:29 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/19/the-final-trump-clinton-debate-transcript-annotated/ [https://perma.cc/47FM-DJRN].
162 Justice Thomas, for instance, has asserted that “the Court’s abortion jurisprudence,
including Casey and Roe v. Wade, . . . has no basis in the Constitution.” Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia echoed that notion while on
the bench, as did Justice Rehnquist. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
163 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Conservative Assault on the Constitution 177 (2010).
164 See, e.g., Timothy Williams & Alan Blinder, Lawmakers Vote To Effectively Ban
Abortion in Alabama, N.Y. Times (May 14, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2VCoxRp [https://perma.cc/V7FU-BPZ7]; Sabrina Tavernise & Adeel Hassan, Missouri Lawmakers Pass Bill
Criminalizing Abortion at About 8 Weeks of Pregnancy, N.Y. Times (May 17, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/2JnFIzP [https://perma.cc/B3DU-KRPF]. These legislative measures are so
recent that they have not yet been extensively discussed by legal commentators.
165 Indeed, even those Justices who ardently support Roe and Casey recognize this potential.
See Leah Litman, Supreme Court Liberals Raise Alarm Bells About Roe v. Wade, N.Y. Times
(May 13, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2WGcWND [https://perma.cc/Z29C-9JWX].
166 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010).
167 See, e.g., Chris Good, Citizens United Decision: Republicans Like It, Liberals
Don’t, Atlantic (Jan. 21, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/01/citizens-united-decision-republicans-like-it-liberals-dont/33935/ [https://perma.cc/8NH7NDWH] (quoting then-Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell as describing the decision
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praise from supporters do not render Citizens United settled from a
descriptive realist perspective. Opposition to the decision emerged almost
immediately. President Obama called out Citizens United during his State
of the Union address, warning that it would “open the floodgates for
special interests, including foreign corporations, to spend without limit in
our elections.”168 Many Democrats have made appointing Supreme Court
justices who are willing to overturn Citizens United a central component
of campaign platforms,169 and, perhaps most importantly, Justices have
openly expressed distaste for the decision.170 In light of such opposition,
a prediction that the Court will continue to uphold Citizens United
indefinitely seems overconfident.
As we explore in Part III, this framework has tremendous explanatory
power—conceptually, rhetorically, and most of all doctrinally. But for
two reasons, it is also the most contingent and dynamic.
First, inherent in the nature of prediction theory is that what seems like
a sure bet today might not actually pay out tomorrow. With time and the
evolution of both jurisprudence and social mores, a precedent that once
seemed impervious to challenge can become contested. Take, for
example, legal arguments regarding the constitutionality of the death
penalty. For centuries, there had been barely any doubt—among Supreme
as an “important step in the direction of restoring the First Amendment rights”); Stephen
Dinan, Divided Court Strikes Down Campaign Money Restrictions, Wash. Times (Jan. 21,
2010), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/21/divided-court-strikes-down-campaign-money-restrict/ [https://perma.cc/9Y3J-6KS4] (quoting Hans A. von Spakovsky,
senior legal fellow at the Heritage Foundation, as saying: “The Supreme Court has restored a
part of the First Amendment that had been unfortunately stolen by Congress and a previously
wrongly-decided ruling of the court.”).
168 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 Pub. Papers
75, 81 (Jan. 27, 2010).
169 For example, when campaigning for Hillary Clinton, Senator Bernie Sanders declared
that the 2016 election was “about overturning Citizens United, one of the worst Supreme Court
decisions in the history of our country.” Michael McGough, Democrats United in
(Over)promising To Reverse Citizens United, L.A. Times (July 26, 2016),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-citizens-sanders-20160726-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/94X6-388J]; see also Alexander Burns, Seven 2020 Democrats Pledge
To Focus First Bill on Fighting Corruption, N.Y. Times (July 29, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2MnZUlO [https://perma.cc/GM74-MVLY] (documenting 2020 Democratic Presidential
candidates’ pledge to enact a “clean-government bill,” earning the support of the liberal
grassroots advocacy group End Citizens United).
170 In 2016, Justice Ginsburg said: “It would be an impossible dream. But I’d love to see
Citizens United overruled.” Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald
Trump, Critiques Latest Term, N.Y. Times (July 10, 2016), https://nyti.ms/29I7mE4
[https://perma.cc/4T4H-2CRD].
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Court Justices or anyone else—that the practice was constitutional.171 But
in recent years, doubt has crept into the discussion. Questions about the
physiological effects of lethal injection, the wrongful conviction of
factually innocent people, and the racially disparate application of death
sentences have led scholars, practitioners, judges, and even members of
the Supreme Court to speak out against the death penalty’s constitutionality.172 Perhaps there is no significant chance that the Supreme Court will
declare the death penalty unconstitutional in the near future, but what was
once virtually certain has become less so.
Second, the settledness of law within this framework exists along a
spectrum. There will never be metaphysical certainty about what a court
will do decades or centuries hence. So, unlike a binary assessment of
whether an earlier decision was right or wrong, predictions about future
court behavior necessarily involve murky, multivariate analyses. In this
gray area, legal actors might disagree about the likelihood that a court will
revisit a particular decision. For example, two conscientious and wellinformed legal actors might make different predictions about how
genuinely settled Citizens United is. One might emphasize that a solid
majority of the Supreme Court is committed to upholding the precedent
and will do so for the foreseeable future. Another might observe that in
light of vociferous and enduring opposition to the decision among some
Justices and politicians, the Court conceivably could revisit the precedent
within a generation.173 Moreover, there is no single moment or degree of
certainty when unsettled law becomes settled (or vice versa). So, for
instance, two people might disagree whether the constitutionality of the
171

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 428 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Indeed, almost all “Eighth Amendment decisions contain[ed] statements—some by the Court,
some by individual Justices—assuming or asserting as a matter of settled law the death
penalty’s constitutionality.” Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 Wash. L. Rev.
1, 13 (2007).
172 See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 946 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I believe it
highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment.”); Kevin Barry, The Death
Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 383, 387 (2017); see also Renee Knake,
Abolishing Death, 13 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 2 (2018) (noting that Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg questioned the death penalty’s constitutionality).
173 Every scholar’s nightmare is a late-breaking development before an article goes to print.
This sentence initially observed that “the Court is one retirement and one Democratic
President away from overruling” Citizens United. To put matters candidly, that precedent now
seems less unsettled than it was when we drafted this Article in early 2020. But all of this just
underscores our point. The inherent contingency of the descriptive realist framework means
that a precedent’s settledness can turn on a single judicial vacancy.
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death penalty is now unsettled or just a bit less settled than it was a century
ago.
A certain imprecision is inherent within this framework, and an
important question always looms over it: How settled is settled?
Nevertheless, it remains one of the most fruitful and explanatory
conceptualizations of settled law.
2. Normative Realism
The normative realist framework, like normative formalism, treats an
earlier decision as settled if it reached the “right” result. What counts as
the right result will differ dramatically under the two frameworks, though,
as realism does not rest on law’s inherent logic—at least not entirely.174
Instead, the right result under a realist conceptualization is more akin to a
wise policy decision—a correct outcome in light of its beneficial
consequences.175 Because of this external orientation—a concern with
real-world consequences—some commentators mistakenly view realism
as a euphemistic way to describe rank policymaking by judges. But it is
more theoretically robust than that caricature. Realism will defend a
particular decision as correct, such that the law is settled from a normative
perspective, based on a holistic account of intra- and extra-legal
justifications.176 Often this means that realism will rely on external
metrics to guide the analysis, whether those are economic efficiency,
individual autonomy, or a host of other possibilities.177 Importantly,
realism is not nihilism. Whether a decision is correct depends not on a
judge’s caprice, but rather on the extent to which that decision
corresponds to the chosen metrics.

174 See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 468, 474 (1990)
(“Given the limitations of deductive logic and analogic reasoning and the existence of vague,
internally contradictory premises and rules, the realists argued that it was almost always
possible to derive multiple and often inconsistent ‘legal’ answers to particular problems.”).
175 Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 139, at 238–39; John Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their
Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 833, 868 (1931) (contrasting the use of
logic with the use of “policy, taste, and value judgments” when resolving cases).
176
See Curtis, supra note 77, at 169.
177 See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76
Tex. L. Rev. 267, 298–99 (1997).
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In recent decades, a number of different interdisciplinary approaches
have sprouted from the realist tradition.178 In this sense, normative realism
is an umbrella term of sorts. Nevertheless, these metrics—often external
and conspicuously consequentialist—are the benchmarks that a realist
will use to assess whether a decision is correct and thus (normatively)
settled.179
Consider, first, the prominent law and economics school,180 which
offers perhaps the purest example of normative realism in action. Law and
economics makes a clear claim about its governing metric—law is a
means of optimizing social efficiencies.181 The metric is external because
the correct answer to any legal problem depends, at least in part, on what
happens in the world beyond the law. Legal rules are determined based
on market efficiencies,182 utility,183 or perhaps wealth maximization,184
rather than pure internal legal logic. So, on this view, the outcome that
yields the greatest net economic benefits is the best (and normatively
settled) result.185
See Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 92 (1995) (“The originality of
legal realism was that it set the scene for the emergence of jurisprudential sub-disciplines of
the ‘law and’ variety.”).
179 “The conventional view portrays the rise of Langdellian formalism as provoking an
antiformalist revolt by Holmes and others, culminating in the Legal Realism of the 1930s,
which instigated a return to formalism in Process jurisprudence and Law and Economics,
which was followed in turn by a realist revival in contemporary Critical jurisprudence, and so
on.” Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 Yale L.J. 493, 508 (1996)
(reviewing Duxbury, supra note 178).
180 For (just a sample of) seminal pieces in the law and economics literature, see R.H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter Calabresi, Risk
Distribution]; Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1972); Guido Calabresi, The
Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Costs
of Accidents].
181 See Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, supra note 180, at 32; see also Gary Lawson,
Efficiency and Individualism, 42 Duke L.J. 53, 53 (1992) (defining law and economics as “the
systematic application of neoclassical price theory to legal problems”).
182 Christian Kirchner, A “European Civil Code”: Potential, Conceptual, and
Methodological Implications, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 671, 678 (1998) (“[L]aw and economics,
in its normative Chicago version, is supposed to . . . produce value judgments on the efficiency
of legal rules.”).
183 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 191, 198–99 (1980).
184 See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud.
103, 119 (1979).
185 Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 Vand. L. Rev.
1729, 1731 (1998) (“At the heart of law and economics stands the idea that comparisons of
utility, the cost and benefit of engaging in a particular course of conduct for a particular actor,
can discipline the analysis of how legal rules should be structured.”).
178
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Or take the critical legal studies movement.186 It reflects a profoundly
different ideology than the law and economics school, but it too stems
from the realist tradition and, specifically, a skepticism of legal
objectivity.187 For the critical scholar, law is a tool for achieving a more
just society, one that can embody and promote genuine equality by
eliminating economic, social, political, and legal hierarchies.188
Determining what constitutes settled law for the critical legal studies
movement requires careful consideration of how an earlier outcome
bolstered or combated entrenched power hierarches, and only decisions
that foster social progress should be considered settled.189
Finally, consider living constitutionalism, an illustrative contrast with
its chief theoretical competitor, constitutional originalism. As we
discussed earlier, originalism is a formalist interpretive theory insofar as
it relies on the Constitution itself (specifically, that document’s original
public meaning). Living constitutionalism explicitly rejects the claim that
“the Constitution is just the document that is under glass in the National
Archives.”190 Rather, its proponents, including jurists like Justice

186 See generally Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1983) (seminal tome).
187 See id. at 564–66; see also Jonathan Turley, Introduction: The Hitchhiker’s Guide to
CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 593, 600 (1987) (“If CLS has a single
rallying cry it is a rejection of formalism, the belief that society can resolve disputes according
to a value-neutral system of rules and doctrine.”); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modern
Society 180–81 (1976) (arguing that every legal argument must “decide, at least implicitly,
which of the competing sets of belief in a given society should be given priority”).
188 Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 302 (1987) (“The CLS critique of the
social order demonstrates that current arrangements and distributions of power are neither
necessary nor natural, and that hierarchy irrationally places some at the top while it sacrifices
those at the bottom.”); Thomas Ross, Introducing Law, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 859, 869 (1987)
(reviewing Stephen J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning (1985)); see
generally James Boyle, Critical Legal Studies (1992) (elucidating core tenets of critical
theory).
189 Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48
UCLA L. Rev. 443, 452 (2001) (articulating the critical legal studies movement’s aim to
“demystify the power hierarchies embedded in liberal individual rights discourse by showing
the indeterminacy of legal rules and the inherently political choices underlying the current
legal order”). For pioneering works employing this normative aim, see Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (1989); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of
Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117 (1996); Charles W. Mills,
The Racial Contract (1999).
190 David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 34 (2010); see also Jack M. Balkin,
Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 549, 592 (2009).
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Breyer191 and the late Justice Ginsburg,192 assert that the “small-c
constitution” includes not just the written document, but also the amalgam
of “precedents, traditions, and understandings” that have evolved in
common-law-like fashion over the centuries.193 Much of the small-c
constitution is thus external to the document itself. Although living
constitutionalism does not rely on the idea that there is a single correct
answer to any constitutional question, it does claim that precedents and
customs act as a meaningful constraint. So, a correct (and normatively
settled) decision is one that falls within the narrow window of discretion
permitted by these precedents.194
From the perspective of settled law, the normative realist framework
might strike someone as odd, at least initially. After all, a theory that relies
on external metrics necessarily considers how the real world evolves, and
the right answer to a legal question based on any of these metrics will
evolve concomitantly. So, if the right answer is subject to change, perhaps
in the near future, can it meaningfully be settled? In short, yes. The only
reason that this argument might seem strange is if one assumes that settled
law denotes an ineffable permanence. But, as we have contended
throughout this Article, settled law is always a term of art. Although there
is perhaps a trans-conceptual stickiness to formalism’s insistence on
eternally correct answers, realism makes no equivalent claim. Instead,
normative realism simply dictates that law should be considered settled
for as long as it is considered right. A legal answer that is emphatically
correct, and therefore settled, for decades or even centuries might
eventually lose that status in light of sociocultural progress, as the debate
about the death penalty illustrates.
Despite normative realism’s structural indeterminacy, legal actors
readily tap into its essential logic. In fact, it is one of the most commonly
invoked frameworks. During Justice Gorsuch’s confirmation hearings,
for example, Senators Franken and Coons insisted that Obergefell v.
Hodges,195 which announced a constitutional right to same-sex marriage,

191

See NLRB. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014).
Jonathan Faust, Law in a Changing Society: A Conversation with RBG, Stan.
Pol. (Feb 8. 2017), https://stanfordpolitics.org/2017/02/08/interview-ruth-bader-ginsburg/
[https://perma.cc/YM2S-GZ25].
193
Strauss, supra note 190, at 35.
194 See id. at 39–40.
195 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
192
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was “settled law.”196 As is usually the case when people invoke the term,
they did not explain exactly what they meant by this description, but in
context, they almost assuredly were making a normative claim about
Obergefell’s correctness using external benchmarks, including the
decision’s sociocultural ramifications. While their claim would be in
tension with formalist theories, it fits comfortably in the normative realist
framework.
C. The Legal Process Framework
The final framework, based on the legal process school, is probably the
most intuitive. It purports to be agnostic about a decision’s substantive
outcome by focusing instead on procedural legitimacy, and it overwhelmingly corresponds to the pure process-based arguments that we
noted at the outset, albeit with more theoretical heft. Legal actors often
couch their arguments about settled law in legal process theory’s core
tenets, but the framework lacks genuine explanatory power.
Legal process theory profoundly influenced the development of the law
during the twentieth century. According to this school of thought, the
structure, procedural design, and methodological features of a judicial
system ultimately imbue it with legitimacy.197 That is, rather than
claiming that a particular legal decision was right because it achieved the
correct substantive result, the legal process school focuses on the
methodology used to produce the decision.198 Did a court of duly
appointed judges render the decision? Did the judges employ an
appropriate decision-making approach when reaching their decision?

196

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 173 (2017) (statement of Sen. Franken); id. at 325 (statement of Sen.
Coons).
197 Indeed, a core tenet of legal process thought—the principle of “institutional
settlement”—suggests that “[l]aw should allocate decisionmaking to the institutions best
suited to decide particular questions, and that the decisions arrived at by those institutions
must then be respected by other actors in the system, even if those actors would have reached
a different conclusion.” Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial
System, 54 Duke L.J. 1143, 1149–50 (2005).
198 Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as an Institution, 85
Calif. L. Rev. 265, 273 (1997) (reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political
Conflict (1996)) (identifying the legal process notion that “law can be treated as a selfcontained, doctrinal system, and that procedural mechanisms can be substituted for substantive
values”).
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Pegging legitimacy to procedure and institutional structure preserves the
rule of law’s authority in a morally pluralistic society.199
As a theoretical matter, legal process theory translates well into the
settled law context. Without a central fixation on achieving the “right”
result in a case,200 the legal process framework essentially merges the
descriptive and normative accounts of settled law. That is, the legal
process framework sees no daylight between what is settled law and what
should be settled law. Instead, the law is and should be settled when a
duly constituted court reaches a decision through an appropriate
methodology. A decision would not be settled only if there is some
institutional breakdown in constituting a court or some methodological
deviation from judicial decision making through “reasoned
elaboration.”201
To see this framework in operation, return for a moment to Roe and
Citizens United.202 For the legal process theorist, both decisions will
qualify as settled law, as a majority of Justices on a duly constituted
Supreme Court resolved those cases through principled, reasoned
decision making. One can surely quibble with whether the majority in
either case marshalled the best possible reasons or even reached the right
result. But for a legal process theorist, those objections are wide of the
mark. The Court in both cases used the familiar tools of legal reasoning,
rather than flipping a coin or baldly stating a policy preference that was
untethered to constitutional text, precedent, and logic. For a legal process
theorist, that is enough. So, because those decisions accorded with
dictates of legal process, they are determinative.203

199 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 73 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (1990)
(“People may believe specific decisions are wrong, even wrongheaded, and individual judges
unworthy of their offices and still continue to support the court if they respect it as an
institution that is generally impartial, just and competent.” (internal citation omitted)); Daniel
Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1367,
1384 (2006).
200 Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and
Intellectual Inquiry, 11 Const. Comment. 463, 479 (1994) (“[L]egal process scholars
believed . . . that ultimate questions of legal legitimacy depend[ed] on a vision of process
divorced from substance and thereby protected from the corrosion of realist critique.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
201 Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2054, 2099 (1995).
202 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
203
Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 348, 348 (1832) (“Whatever principles are established
in [an earlier] opinion, are to be considered no longer open for controversy, but the settled law
of the court.”).
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While the legal process framework offers a simple yet sophisticated
definition of settled law, it actually has very little purchase for several
reasons. First, it does not answer a key question. Even if a decision like
Roe or Citizens United is legitimate under the legal process framework, is
a duly constituted Supreme Court ever allowed to overrule precedent?
The strongest version of the legal process claim would deny the Court that
power precisely because the initial decision was legitimate and thus
settled.
Second, and relatedly, the framework proves too much. Under a purely
procedural view of settled law—unlike arguments rooted in the policies
that justify stare decisis—any procedurally legitimate decision would be
final, settled, and impervious to correction.204 It would leave no room for
overruling even the likes of Dred Scott v. Sandford205 or Plessy v.
Ferguson.206
Finally, despite the legal process framework’s rhetorical cachet, it
suffers from an obvious problem of insincerity and is a thinly veiled
stand-in for normative arguments that a listener might not be willing to
accept. So, for example, Senator Hatch, a longtime opponent of abortion,
did not ask then-Judge Sotomayor whether she agreed substantively with
Gonzales v. Carhart, the decision that upheld a partial-birth abortion ban
as constitutional. Instead, he wanted her to agree that it was “settled
law.”207 Similarly, Senator Coons sought the same assurance from thenJudge Gorsuch regarding Obergefell.208 Even though the Senators framed
their arguments in legal process terms, this framework was functioning as
a pretext.
III. WHY SETTLED LAW MATTERS
Theoretical clarity about settled law is far more than an exercise in
linguistic precision. The idea pervades political discourse about judicial
nominations, and it often plays a defining role in doctrines as disparate as

204

See Somin, supra note 22.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
206 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
207 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 85 (2009) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
208
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 325 (2017) (statement of Sen. Coons).
205
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constitutional torts, standards of review, civil sanctions, and retroactivity.
But despite its ubiquity, settled law often confounds more than it
illuminates.
In this Part, we begin by demonstrating our taxonomy’s power to
clarify various doctrines, making them both more administrable and
coherent. Qualified immunity offers an especially salient example. Courts
have conspicuously tethered the doctrine to settled law, but they have
done so in a way that seems to lead to contradictions and errors. The
doctrine nicely illustrates how controlling law and settled law are distinct.
Moreover, situating qualified immunity within two of the taxonomy’s
frameworks reveals how certain doctrinal quirks are actually integral to
vindicating qualified immunity’s overarching goals. We also suggest that
the taxonomy has similar explanatory power with respect to other
doctrines, including the “plain error” standard of review.
Finally, a clearer understanding of settled law can and should inform
debates about the proper judicial role. For example, during recent
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, politicians, nominees, and the
general public have tended to use “settled law” to convey disparate ideas,
leading to confusion and, even worse, allegations of bad faith. Clarity in
terminology can prevent stakeholders from intentionally, or
unintentionally, talking past one another. It can also lead to a more
productive dialogue about the appropriate role of lower-court judges.
Lower-court judges are of course constrained by controlling higher-court
pronouncements, but settled law that has not yet become formally
controlling also operates as an important constraint on the power,
discretion, and legitimacy of lower courts.
A. Doctrinal Reform
1. Qualified Immunity
Of the doctrines that rely on settled law, qualified immunity does so
most conspicuously. It underscores the pitfalls of conflating settled law
and controlling law, and it illuminates the practical application of the
taxonomy that we have developed. Moreover, it shows that identifying
the reason for asking whether law is settled is a critical part of the
doctrinal analysis.
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The doctrinal framework of Section 1983209 and qualified immunity is
relatively clear, at least at a high level of abstraction. Section 1983 creates
a cause of action when a state official (or, more precisely, someone acting
“under color of” state law) violates a person’s federal civil rights.210 The
Section 1983 plaintiff may sue an official for money damages, but most
executive officials, including police officers, enjoy qualified immunity.211
As the Supreme Court has refined the doctrine over the years, it has
expressly tried to strike a balance between competing values. On the one
hand, Section 1983 vindicates “[t]he public interest in deterrence of
unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims”;212 on the other,
executive officials do not incur personal liability unless they violate
“clearly established” rights.213 So, in order to overcome a defendant’s
qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show not only that an official’s
action violated a federally guaranteed right but also that “the legal
rules . . . were ‘clearly established’ at the time [the action] was taken.”214
Whether a right is “clearly established” overwhelmingly turns on
settled law. In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly defined the “clearly
established” standard in terms of “settled law.”215 But what precisely does
that term mean in this context?
For decades, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that law can be settled
(1) through “cases of controlling authority” in the relevant jurisdiction or
(2) through “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”216 It has
signaled that the first option, “controlling” authority, largely tracks the
way that we have defined that term—precedent that is binding in a
particular jurisdiction. So, for example, the Court has looked to Tenth
Circuit precedent when determining whether certain rights were “clearly

209

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The modern interpretation of § 1983 traces back to Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
which turned the long dormant statute into a potent weapon for enforcing civil rights by
bringing state officials’ abuse of authority within § 1983’s ambit.
211 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974) (describing qualified immunity).
212 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
213 Id. at 818 (holding government officials immune if “their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known”).
214 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
215 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 (2018) (“The rule applied
by the panel majority was not clearly established because it was not ‘settled law.’”) (quoting
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)); Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228 (“[T]he court should
ask whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances . . . .”).
216 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999); see also Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589–90.
210
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established” in Colorado.217 Moreover, it has observed that “district court
decisions—unlike those from the courts of appeals—do not necessarily
settle constitutional standards or prevent repeated claims of qualified
immunity” because district courts never create binding precedent.218
Although the Court consistently leaves open various avenues by which
law can be settled (and a right “clearly established”), it usually talks the
talk of controlling law, which it at times suggests is the touchstone in this
area. A number of lower courts have followed suit. For example, in
determining whether a right is clearly established, some have focused
almost exclusively on precedents of the Supreme Court and the relevant
federal court of appeals.219 Others have taken a slightly more expansive
approach, but only to consult precedent of other courts that create binding
precedent within a jurisdiction. Thus, for example, the Eleventh Circuit
looks exclusively to “decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of
the pertinent state.”220 And in a similar vein, a number of lower courts

217 See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665–66 (2012); cf. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 591 n.8
(“We have not yet decided what precedents—other than our own—qualify as controlling
authority for purposes of qualified immunity.”).
218 Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011).
219 See, e.g., Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that only Supreme
Court and Second Circuit precedent can clearly establish a right); Anderson v. Recore, 317
F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding the same); see also Virgili v. Gilbert, 272 F.3d 391, 393
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding that “precedent from other circuits may ‘clearly establish’ a right only
in extraordinary cases”).
220 Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1032–33 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001); see also, e.g.,
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1351 n.22 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Marsh for the same
proposition). Judge Brown of the D.C. Circuit has suggested a similar approach. See Corrigan
v. District of Columbia, 841 F.3d 1022, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Brown, J., dissenting).
The Fourth Circuit “look[s] ordinarily to ‘the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court of
appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the case arose.’” Owens ex rel. Owens v.
Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 279 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
251 (4th Cir. 1999)). Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, though, the Fourth Circuit does not view
controlling law as the sole means by which rights can be clearly established. See, e.g., Booker
v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that in the absence of
controlling authority, rights could be established through a demonstration either that a general
constitutional rule applied with “obvious clarity,” or that there was a consensus of persuasive
authority).
The Supreme Court itself has taken this approach but without comment. See Stanton v.
Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 10 (2013) (per curiam) (finding qualified immunity based significantly on
the fact that “two opinions of the [California] State Court of Appeal affirmatively authorized”
the officer’s conduct).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

102

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:57

have treated district court precedent as categorically irrelevant because it
is never binding.221
How, then, is qualified immunity really about settled law (as we
contend) when all of these tests have the ring of controlling law? Courts
are conflating the two concepts, and, in one important respect, that move
is entirely understandable. When a Supreme Court precedent is on point,
that precedent is binding on a lower court and thus controlling. It can also
be settled under many (and potentially all) of the definitions within our
taxonomy. For example, a precedent that the Court is highly unlikely to
reverse would be settled from the descriptive realist perspective and also
controlling throughout the country. Without context, a legal actor does
not necessarily know whether she should care about a Supreme Court
precedent because it is controlling or because it is settled.
In another (and more insidious) respect, courts’ purported focus on
controlling law in the qualified immunity context is really about settled
law. The Supreme Court has said that the usual route by which law
becomes clearly established is through “cases of controlling authority in
[the plaintiffs’] jurisdiction at the time of the incident.”222 This is not
necessarily limited to federal courts that create binding precedent. The
Supreme Court has consulted binding state court cases to determine
whether a rule is clearly established (and thus settled) in that state.223
Moreover, even some of the lower federal courts that seem least inclined
to look beyond their own precedents explicitly acknowledge that a state’s
highest court can clearly establish a right.224 Structurally this makes sense.
Federal and state courts presumptively have concurrent jurisdiction to
adjudicate most federal law,225 including Section 1983, and neither takes
precedence over the other.226 So, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Virginia both have the

221

See, e.g., Boyd v. Owen, 481 F.3d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson v. Romero,
72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(Tatel, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that district court
opinions neither “establish the law of the circuit” nor “even establish the law of the district”).
222 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
223 See Stanton, 571 U.S. at 9–10 (consulting California Court of Appeal decisions).
224 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
225 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–60 (1990).
226
See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 759, 771 (1979) (arguing that lower “federal courts are no more than coordinate with
the state courts on issues of federal law”).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Settled Law

103

power (and the duty227) to interpret Section 1983, and both create binding
precedent throughout Virginia. Superficially, this approach might look
like an application of controlling law. After all, a Virginia official should
be aware of all binding precedent, in part because she cannot know exante whether she will be sued in state or federal court.
The conceptual problem—illustrating that the qualified immunity
inquiry doesn’t really turn on controlling law—is that Fourth Circuit
precedent is binding and thus controlling only on federal courts in
Virginia (and elsewhere in the circuit), whereas Virginia Supreme Court
precedent is binding only on state courts. So, if a Virginia official is sued
under Section 1983 in federal court, that court might find that Virginia
Supreme Court precedent has clearly established a right. But this
conclusion has nothing to do with controlling law. Rather, the state court
decision, while not binding on federal courts, has provided Virginia
officials with clear notice of their obligations toward citizens. Such
notice, rather than the intricacies of how binding precedent works, is the
gravamen of whether qualified immunity applies.228
Some courts have tied themselves into even worse conceptual knots by
misunderstanding why certain precedents do (and don’t) matter. For
example, the Sixth Circuit has held that “in the ordinary instance, to find
a clearly established constitutional right, a district court must find binding
precedent by the Supreme Court, its court of appeals or itself.”229 The
Second Circuit similarly has suggested that district courts’ power to
clearly establish rights is confined to their geographic jurisdiction.230 On
what theory can a district court, which of course does not create binding
precedent, clearly establish a right but only within its own geographic
boundaries? The court of appeals judges apparently extrapolated that the
geographic sweep of precedent—both binding and persuasive—must
inform the qualified immunity analysis. Years after these odd
pronouncements, a similar confusion earned a vintage acerbic rebuke
from Justice Scalia.231
227

See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380–81 (1990) (holding that Florida state courts may
not decline jurisdiction over § 1983 actions against state entities).
228 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002) (emphasizing § 1983 defendants’
“right to fair notice”).
229 Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Ass’n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis
added).
230
See Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547, 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
231 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (chastising court of appeals for finding
that district court dictum that “‘call[ed] out Ashcroft by name’!” was sufficient to put Attorney
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Thinking about qualified immunity in terms of settled law—rather than
controlling law or geography—ameliorates the doctrine’s apparent
contradictions and inscrutability. This is perhaps easiest to see by
considering the second way that plaintiffs can show a clearly established
right—through a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”232 The
persuasive authority route is revealing on a number of levels. In addition
to elucidating the role of settled law, it demonstrates that the reason for
asking whether law is settled proves critically important to the doctrinal
analysis. And it offers one of the clearest examples of the rare situation in
which law can be settled even if it isn’t controlling.
Begin with why courts and litigants care whether a right is clearly
established. In many cases, a court will have concluded that an official
has violated a citizen’s civil rights.233 Immunity nonetheless is
appropriate if the official did not have fair warning that her actions would
violate someone’s rights.234 Thus, the inquiry as to whether the law was
settled serves a notice-giving function. If different courts have defined
rights in different ways, an official might not know what her obligations
are, and that is the exact scenario in which officials enjoy immunity.235
But the opposite situation is also possible—that courts have generated a
“robust consensus”236 on a matter and thereby put officials on notice that
certain conduct is unlawful. More concretely, the precedents, despite not
being controlling law, warn officials that certain conduct is unlawful and
that they will be liable for damages if they engage in it.
In this way, non-controlling precedent is relevant to the qualified
immunity analysis because it can allow an official to predict the likely
consequences of certain actions. Consider South Carolina prison officials
who are upset that an inmate has filed a prison grievance under applicable
procedures and are contemplating certain retaliatory measures. No
binding Fourth Circuit precedent is directly on point. Yet the Second,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all have held
General on notice and clearly establish a right) (citations omitted) (emphasis, of course, Justice
Scalia’s).
232 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
233 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–43 (2009) (giving courts discretion to decide
immunity question before deciding whether a right existed).
234 See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–
40 (2002).
235
See, e.g., Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
“[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas”).
236 al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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that such retaliation would violate an inmate’s rights under the First
Amendment’s Petition Clause.237 And there is no precedent going the
other way.238 What do those prison officials expect will happen if they
retaliate against the inmate and then are sued in a court in the Fourth
Circuit? The “robust consensus of persuasive authority”239 surely gives
them more than an inkling.
The analysis calls for classic Holmesian prediction (or “bad man”)
theory. Functionally, qualified immunity’s concern for giving officials
“fair warning” corresponds to the descriptive realist framework, which
regards law as settled when someone can predict to a high degree of
certainty what the law will be in a future case.
From a predictive viewpoint, the existence (or absence) of controlling
law is a red herring. True, stable Supreme Court precedent will be the
most consequential data point, but not because it is controlling; instead, it
has the highest predictive value and thereby offers the clearest warning.
An official is also likely to consult precedents of the courts in which she
acts and is most likely to be sued. So, in the earlier example, a Virginia
official will look to precedents of federal and state courts in Virginia when
trying to predict the outcome of a lawsuit, even though federal precedent
interpreting Section 1983 is not controlling in state court or vice versa.
Note also that geography is not determinative. While local precedent
might help an official predict what will happen in those courts in future
cases, precedent from much farther afield can also clarify and settle the
law—again, in terms of prediction theory—which an official may
disregard only at her peril.
Treating settled law—specifically, from the descriptive realist
perspective—as the touchstone of qualified immunity has tremendous
explanatory and conceptual power. It demonstrates why certain
precedents, especially from the Supreme Court, are highly relevant. At
the same time, it explains why the analysis does not perfectly track
notions of binding precedent and thus why courts shouldn’t fetishize
controlling law, which might function, at best, as a rule of thumb to
discern whether law is settled. Relatedly, the descriptive realist
framework crystallizes why the settled or unsettled nature of law matters.
See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 544 (4th Cir. 2017).
See id. at 545 (observing that “the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have recognized an
inmate’s right to be free from retaliation for filing a grievance under the First Amendment
(albeit without referencing a particular clause)”).
239 Id. at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted).
237
238
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And it trains courts’ attention on the right questions as they navigate
murky doctrinal waters. Among the most difficult questions is exactly
how settled the law must be, and, on this score, courts vary significantly.
At the strictest end of the spectrum, some courts have suggested that there
is not a “consensus of persuasive authority” unless most courts of appeals
have weighed in on a particular issue240 or if the consensus is not truly
unanimous.241 At the other end, the Eighth Circuit candidly has “taken a
broad view of what constitutes ‘clearly established law,’”242 sometimes
finding consensus on scant authority.243 Most courts fall somewhere in
between.244 Notwithstanding differences among courts, these questions
about fair notice and the law’s settledness are—and should be—the heart
of the analysis.
The taxonomy of settled law that we have developed does not
necessarily tell courts how to allocate the costs of mistakes between
victims and officials or how much warning is required before an official
must pay for such mistakes. But settled law does offer some lessons. It
clarifies precedent’s notice-giving function and thereby suggests that
courts should use those precedents in a more global way in order to
ascertain whether the state of the law is genuinely settled. Absolute
certainty is not the standard. But neither should a court cherry pick a few
examples to reach its preferred conclusion. This suggests an “all in”
approach. Accordingly, courts should not categorically reject the value of
district court decisions. Such precedents are relevant not because they are
binding (they never are) or because of the issuing court’s geographic
jurisdiction. Rather, in sufficient numbers they can paint a clearer picture

240

See, e.g., Panagoulakos v. Yazzie, 741 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding no
consensus because “[t]he majority of courts have never imposed such a duty”); see also
Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 879–80 (5th Cir. 2019) (six circuits insufficient to
establish consensus).
241 See, e.g., Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 957–58 (7th Cir. 2000).
242 Boswell v. Sherburne County, 849 F.2d 1117, 1121 (8th Cir. 1988).
243 See, e.g., Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70, 74 (8th Cir. 1995) (relying on one district court
opinion and two out-of-circuit precedents); see also Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d
1086, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2013) (relying on one Tenth Circuit and two district court opinions).
244 See, e.g., Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing two Ninth Circuit
and one Third Circuit case in finding law clearly established); Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d
186, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding law clearly established by the only three reported court
of appeals decisions on point); Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780, 784–87 (6th Cir. 1991)
(finding law clearly established by precedent from First, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits as well as
Sixth Circuit dicta).
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of what the law is and will be.245 They can, in other words, help establish
a genuine consensus that, in turn, enables officials to confidently predict
court behavior.
Finally, we note one manifestation of qualified immunity that does not
cohere as readily with the descriptive realist framework of settled law but
that the taxonomy still explains. On occasion, the Supreme Court and
lower courts note that law can be clearly established, and thus settled,
even without any precedent. That might seem paradoxical, given courts’
insistence on fair warning, but some conduct is so “outrageous”246 or
bespeaks such “obvious cruelty”247 that it is blatantly unconstitutional.
Judge Posner hypothesized a situation in which welfare officials sell
children into slavery and suggested that “it does not follow that if such a
case arose, the officials would be immune from damages liability because
no previous case had found liability in those circumstances.”248 Or, to put
the matter more succinctly, “[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise.”249
One might argue that these cases actually do fit into the descriptive
realist framework. Anyone could easily predict how a court would rule in
Judge Posner’s hypothetical child slavery case. But this category of
cases—settled without precedent, one might say—belongs more naturally
in one of the normative frameworks. To some questions there is a right
answer, and (almost) everyone knows what it is.
Several courts have relied on this theory to find that officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity when they engaged in exceptionally
egregious conduct.250 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has eloquently
explained why such cases, even in the absence of precedent, still cohere
with what we have described as the normative formalist framework of
245 A global approach also means that a losing party at the district court level cannot, by
declining to appeal, prevent that decision from becoming part of the broader qualified
immunity analysis. This seems eminently sensible, insofar as qualified immunity aims to
vindicate fair notice rather than structural concerns, like judicial hierarchy.
246 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377–78 (2009).
247 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002).
248 K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990).
249 Id.
250 See, e.g., Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d 907, 933 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that officials
involved in Flint Water Crisis who took “affirmative steps to systematically contaminate a
community through its public water supply” were complicit in “government invasion of the
highest magnitude”); Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing
prosecutor as attempting to incarcerate a material witness indefinitely without a court’s
reauthorization); McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing
officer’s “holding a gun to the head of a 9-year-old and threatening to pull the trigger,” despite
the fact that the child posed no threat to anyone).
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settled law: “The absence of ‘a prior case directly on all fours’ here speaks
not to the unsettledness of the law, but to the brashness of the conduct.”251
2. Plain Error
Appellate courts often invoke settled law when they apply the “plain
error” standard of review, which governs “when a party seeks an appellate
remedy for error that was not properly preserved in the trial court.”252 In
defining what counts not just as an error, but one that is plain—meaning
“obvious” or “clear”253—the Supreme Court254 and each circuit255 have
explicitly relied on the concept of settled law.
As with qualified immunity, courts dealing with plain error frequently
link the notions of controlling and settled law. For example, many courts
hold that an error is plain “when the settled law of the Supreme Court or
this circuit establishes that an error has occurred.”256
Although this language is redolent of controlling law, we contend that
plain error analysis, particularly in the criminal law setting, is (again)
fundamentally a question of settled law. Courts’ framing of the legal issue
as well as the underlying logic of plain error analysis strongly suggest as
much.
First, several courts of appeals have expressly left open the possibility
that they could find plain error even “in the absence of controlling

251 Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 424 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pinder v. Johnson, 54
F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
252 See Harry T. Edwards & Linda A. Elliott, Federal Courts Standards of Review 91 (2007);
see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
253 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
254 See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (defining plain error to mean
that “the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal”).
255 See United States v. Ríos-Hernández, 645 F.3d 456, 463 n.4 (1st Cir. 2011); United
States v. Gamez, 577 F.3d 394, 400 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Fraser, 42 F. App’x 532,
534 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 516 (4th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Medina-Mendoza, 743 F. App’x 542, 542 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Yancy,
725 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Carraway, 612 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.
2010); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S.
at 466–67); United States v. Wilde, 674 F. App’x 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1309 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Maragh, 189 F.3d 1315, 1316
(11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Askew, 88 F.3d 1065, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
256
United States v. Neal, 101 F.3d 993, 998 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted);
see also, e.g., United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).
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authority” from the Supreme Court or their own circuits.257 Echoing
language from the qualified immunity caselaw, these courts recognize
that a legal rule can become clear or obvious through a consensus of
persuasive authority.258 And, in fact, appellate courts occasionally find
that, despite the lack of binding precedent, an error was obvious based on
overwhelming persuasive authority.259
Second, the purpose of plain error review suggests that the analytical
touchstone really is settled law. Here again, a key part of the analysis is
figuring out why courts care if the law is settled. The Supreme Court has
strongly indicated that the plain error inquiry does not actually serve to
protect a criminal defendant, at least not in the first instance.260 From a
defendant’s perspective, the error committed by a lower court is exactly
the same, regardless of whether the defendant preserved the issue, yet the
standard of review shifts based on the defendant’s litigation behavior.
Why not allow all alleged errors to be reviewed under the same standard
(if accuracy is the goal) or deem all unpreserved challenges forfeited (if
the system wants to encourage timely objections)? In other words, why
does it matter whether the error contravened settled law?
Answering these questions, the Supreme Court has held that appellate
courts “should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if
the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.’”261 On this view, the judicial system can live with
most errors, particularly if the defendant does not raise an objection.
Usually, the loss is the defendant’s alone. But some errors are grievously
intolerable because they have the potential to shake public confidence in
the judicial system’s basic fairness and integrity. Plain error review
arguably targets this precise situation by mitigating an abjectly “wrong”
257

Carthorne, 726 F.3d at 516 n.14 (citing Neal, 101 F.3d at 998).
See United States v. Smith, 815 F.3d 671, 675 (10th Cir. 2016); see also, e.g., United
States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 42 (1st Cir. 2012).
259 See, e.g., United States v. Hope, 545 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding plain error
based on “confluence” of persuasive authority from five circuits); United States v. Gore, 154
F.3d 34, 47 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying on “the uniform holdings of our sister circuits” to find plain
error).
260 See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (noting that plain error review
primarily seeks to protect “judicial proceedings”).
261 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (quoting United States v. Atkinson,
297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)); cf. Jeffrey L. Lowry, Note, Plain Error Rule—Clarifying Plain
Error Analysis Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 1065, 1078–82 (1994) (arguing that Olano misconstrued the purpose of the
plain error rule, which historically has focused on defects in the adversarial system).
258
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decision’s institutional effects. Correcting the error aims primarily to
restore public confidence in the judiciary and only collaterally to benefit
defendants.262 And on that score, the nuances of controlling law are not
really what identify the types of errors that jeopardize public confidence
in the judicial system.
Within this framing, the Supreme Court has suggested that plain error
review governs situations in which an obvious answer exists to a question,
yet the trial court failed to reach that result. Accordingly, settled law in
this context seems to refer to the taxonomy’s two normative frameworks.
These versions of settled law, rather than controlling law, correspond far
more readily with the underlying purpose of plain error review: ferreting
out errors that implicate institutional integrity. Controlling law is, at best,
a rule of thumb that can assist the motivating inquiry; at worst, it is a
distraction or perhaps even a mistake.
3. And Many Others
The qualified immunity and plain error contexts are merely the tip of
the iceberg. Settled law plays a central role in a multitude of wide-ranging
doctrines. Courts consider it when assessing the propriety of sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,263 the reasonability of a
sentence,264 the appropriateness of certifying a question for appeal,265 the
existence of a Fourth Amendment violation,266 the extent to which law
can be modified,267 fraudulent joinder,268 ineffective assistance of

See, e.g., Troy D. Shelton, Note, Plain Error but No Plain Future: North Carolina’s Plain
Error Review After State v. Lawrence, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 2218, 2240 (2013) (noting situations
in which plain error might harm the judicial system even if the error had no impact on the
outcome of a defendant’s case).
263 Pro. Mgmt. Assocs. v. KPMG LLP, 345 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2003); Ahmed v.
Gateway Grp. One, No. 12 Civ. 0524, 2012 WL 2061601, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).
264 United States v. Brown, 495 F. App’x 300, 303 (4th Cir. 2012).
265 Holmes v. FEC, 823 F.3d 69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
266 Lincoln v. Scott, 887 F.3d 190, 198 (5th Cir. 2018).
267 United States v. Villanueva, 174 F. App’x 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2006); Traczyk v. Conn.
Co., 190 A.2d 922, 924 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1963).
268 Simpkins v. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc., No. C-10-02353, 2010 WL 3155844, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010).
262
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counsel,269 retroactivity,270 and the viability of habeas claims.271 Across
these diverse contexts, our settled law taxonomy enables jurists, scholars,
and practitioners to hone their reasoning and arguments, encouraging
precision and clarity in what are often analytically muddy waters.
As we have emphasized throughout this Article, settled law does not
necessarily mean the same thing across different contexts. The key lies in
figuring out why courts care about whether law is settled in any given
area, and the answer to that question in turn points to the appropriate
analytical framework within the taxonomy.
B. Discursive Reform
Very little legal jargon makes its way into the popular imagination, yet
“settled law” ranks among the few exceptions that have influenced
modern discourse about the role of courts in society.272 Lawyers,
politicians, journalists, and everyday citizens consistently invoke the
phrase for rhetorical and persuasive effect.273 It has graced the headlines
of the New York Times274 and Washington Post275 and has been the focus

269 Zapata v. United States, 193 F. App’x 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2006); Hamberg v. United States,
675 F.3d 1170, 1173 (8th Cir. 2012).
270 Redhouse v. Comm’r, 728 F.2d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 1984); Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr.
v. Leavitt, 531 F.3d 844, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
271 Napoli v. United States, 32 F.3d 31, 36–37 (2d Cir. 1994), on reh’g, 45 F.3d 680 (2d Cir.
1995).
272 Perhaps the most notable exception is the Miranda warning, which almost anyone who
has ever seen a police procedural can repeat verbatim.
273 Tim Hains, President Obama: Obamacare Is Settled and “Here To Stay”
RealClearPolitics (Oct. 1 2013), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2013/10/01/president_obama_obamacare_is_settled_and_here_to_stay.html [https://perma.cc/2AFC-NJ
52]; Jim Brunner, Mayor Pete Buttigieg Brings His Presidential Campaign to Seattle, Seattle
Times (Feb. 25, 2020, 1:18 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/mayorpete-buttigieg-brings-his-presidential-campaign-to-seattle [https://perma.cc/4GEH-FV7J].
274 E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Roe Is ‘Settled Law,’ Kavanaugh Tells Collins. Democrats
Aren’t Moved., N.Y. Times (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/us/politics/kavanaugh-collins-abortion.html [https://perma.cc/86GS-RR6H].
275 E.g., Robert Barnes & Michael Kranish, Kavanaugh Advised Against Calling Roe v.
Wade ‘Settled Law’ While a White House Lawyer, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 2018, 11:51 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/kavanaugh-advised-against-callingroe-v-wade-settled-law-while-a-white-house-lawyer/2018/09/06/f30216dc-b1df-11e8-a20b5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.15a2895528c3 [https://perma.cc/R66P-TRSE].
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of popular think-pieces.276 Indeed, studies show that just about everyone
has some intuitive working definition of settled law.277
But public discourse, like doctrine, has suffered from definitional
imprecision, as people often use this single term to convey conceptually
disparate ideas. Two people discussing “settled law” become ships
passing in the night if, for example, one person is making a normative
argument when the other is operating within one of the descriptive
frameworks. The imprecision doesn’t just foment semantic frustration but
also can lead to allegations of disingenuousness or bad faith. Nowhere is
the bite of this discursive dilemma more prominent than in judicial
confirmation hearings.
During their hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chief
Justice Roberts278 and Justices Thomas,279 Breyer,280 Alito,281
Sotomayor,282 Kagan,283 Gorsuch,284 Kavanaugh,285 and Barrett286 all
E.g., Garrett Epps, Kavanaugh’s Unsettling Use of ‘Settled Law’, Atlantic (Sept. 3,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/kavanaughs-unsettling-use-of-settled-law/569212/ [https://perma.cc/8VS7-A5JQ]; Nancy Northup, ‘Settled Law’ Is Not
Enough To Protect Roe v. Wade, Hill (Sept. 4, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/404934-settled-law-is-not-enough-to-protect-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/VYU3-9P4D].
277 Matthew Sheffield, Poll: 56 Percent Say Supreme Court Should Consider Roe v. Wade
Settled Law, Hill (June 7, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/447471poll-56-percent-of-americans-say-supreme-court-should-consider [https://perma.cc/575J-BMKX].
278 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 145 (2005).
279 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 184 (1991).
280 Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 137 (1994).
281 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 352 (2006).
282 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2009).
283 The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 65 (2010).
284 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 78 (2017).
285 C-SPAN, supra note 12; see also Epps, supra note 276; Northrup, supra note 276.
286
C-SPAN, Barrett Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 2, C-SPAN (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?476316-4/barrett-confirmation-hearing-day-2-part-2
[https://perma.cc/C7SZ-CYRK] (relevant exchange occurring from 1:30:05 to 1:30:50).
276
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discussed or responded to questions about settled law. Senators asked the
nominees about the status of key precedents, often pressing them to
concede that past Supreme Court rulings to which the nominee might be
hostile nonetheless constitute settled law.287 For example, Justice Alito
answered one question by saying that the “status of independent agencies,
I think, is now settled in the case law. . . . [They do not] violate the
separation of powers.”288 Similarly, Justice Breyer asserted that the
“constitutionality of the death penalty . . . is, in my opinion, settled
law.”289
An erstwhile nominee’s statements before the Senate Judiciary
Committee often seem in tension with his or her eventual decisions on the
Court. In an apparent contradiction to his confirmation hearing statement,
for instance, Justice Alito recently announced that “[i]f a majority of this
Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken [to agencies]
for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”290 Similarly, Justice
Breyer recently declared it “highly likely that the death penalty violates
the Eighth Amendment.”291 Commentators have noted other apparent
contradictions by the Justices.292
287 For example, Senator Chris Coons asked then-Judge Neil Gorsuch during his Supreme
Court Confirmation hearing, “[I]s Casey and this particular piece of the Casey holding
indisputably settled law?” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch
To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 324 (2017) (statement of Sen. Coons). Similarly,
Senator Klobuchar sought assurances from then-Judge Barrett that Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S.
355 (1932), which concerned apportionment and elections, was “settled law.” C-SPAN, supra
note 286.
288 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 352 (2006) (statement of Alito, J.).
289 Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 137 (1994)
(statement of Breyer, J.).
290 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
291 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 946 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
292 Senator Amy Klobuchar, for instance, recently criticized Justice Neil Gorsuch’s
dissenting opinion in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), as having violated
the fidelity that then-Judge Gorsuch pledged to precedent during his confirmation hearing. See
C-SPAN, Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Day 3, Part 3, CSPAN (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?449706-2/supreme-court-nomineebrett-kavanaugh-confirmation-hearing-day-3-part-3 [https://perma.cc/J898-CQHS] (relevant
exchange occurring from 48:40 to 49:05). Justice Kavanaugh also faced criticism for a
perceived inconsistency between his confirmation hearing testimony and his previous legal
analysis at the Office of Legal Counsel. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text
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But are these contradictions at all? Our taxonomy of settled law
suggests not (at least, potentially). Rather than blatant disingenuousness
or bad faith, tension between confirmation hearing statements and
Supreme Court votes is often the result of definitional imprecision.
Instead of endorsing the constitutionality of independent agencies or the
death penalty as a normative matter, Justices Alito and Breyer
(respectively) more likely declared those holdings settled law because
they did not foresee any danger that the Court would disturb them in the
near future. That is, Justices Alito and Breyer simply responded to
questioning about the settled status of a precedent by using the descriptive
realist conceptual framework.293
Nominees across the political spectrum have adopted this tactic—
responding to difficult normative questions about settled law by pivoting
to a descriptive conceptual framework. For example, Chief Justice
Roberts declared during his confirmation hearing that Casey is “a
precedent of the Court, entitled to respect under principles of stare
decisis . . . it is settled.”294 Although some might question whether this
answer truthfully reflects Chief Justice Robert’s views on whether Casey
is settled as a normative matter, there is no reason yet to suspect it is
untruthful under the descriptive formalist settled law framework. So, too,
Justice Sotomayor’s statement that Gonzalez v. Carhart’s partial-birth
abortion ban is “settled law subject to the deference [the] doctrine of stare
decisis would counsel.”295 And Justice Kagan’s statement that “Citizens
United is settled law going forward. There is no question that it’s
precedent, that it’s entitled to all the weight that precedent usually
gets.”296 And Justice Gorsuch’s insistence that “Casey is settled law in the
sense that it is a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court . . . entitled to the

(describing Kavanaugh’s seemingly contradictory statements about the Supreme Court’s
abortion jurisprudence).
293 See supra Subsection II.B.1.
294 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 145 (2005)
(statement of Roberts, J.).
295 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 85 (2009) (statement of Sotomayor, J.).
296
The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 92 (2010)
(statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor General of the United States.).
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weight of precedent, which is quite considerable.”297 Given the
imprecision of settled law, nominees can shift deftly into a descriptive
framework and offer answers that are truthful, so far as they go.
Of course, the reality is that Senators are often uninterested in
descriptive statements. Politicians and the public want to know what a
nominee believes is the right result to a particular legal question, not
merely what the nominee predicts will happen to a precedent (and even
less so whether an earlier precedent was procedurally legitimate, as it
almost assuredly was).
The taxonomy offers a way to sharpen the conversation surrounding
Supreme Court nominations. Through more precise vocabulary,
nominees, Senators, interest groups, and the public at large can engage in
a more fruitful and edifying conversation, rather than becoming mired in
conceptual ambiguity or, worse, doublespeak. Instead of allowing for
obfuscation by simply asking whether a nominee considers Roe or
Citizens United settled law, questioners should use the clearer language
of each conceptual framework. Did Roe arrive at the correct
understanding of constitutional law? Should the Supreme Court continue
to follow Citizens United in light of its intra- and extra-legal
consequences? Do principles of stare decisis require continued adherence
to Casey?
Admittedly, Senators sometimes try to be more precise by asking
whether a nominee considers a decision to be correct. Extracting a
genuine response to such questions might prove difficult, but the
taxonomy can still be useful. Nominees who describe a precedent as being
entitled to stare decisis should be asked to provide a more precise answer.
What exactly is their theory of stare decisis? Under what circumstances
does it counsel adhering to a decision that might be objectively incorrect?
Not only would greater conceptual clarity foster a more productive
dialogue, it also would mitigate allegations of bad faith that stem from
ambiguous language.
Finally, a clearer understanding of settled law suggests ways to
improve the conversation surrounding nominees to the lower federal
courts. Unlike Supreme Court Justices, who are never absolutely bound
by any precedent, lower-court judges often must apply controlling law—
that is, binding precedent from a higher court. Although Senators try to
297

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 324 (2017) (statement of Gorsuch, J.).
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suss out lower-court nominees’ views on a range of decisions, nominees
increasingly decline to answer such questions, perhaps most famously in
recent years when they have refused to discuss even the correctness of
Brown v. Board of Education.298 Instead, these nominees essentially
pledge fealty to the idea of controlling precedent, which they promise to
apply faithfully, and imply that other questions are irrelevant for lowercourt judges.299 We have shown that this view is dangerously incomplete,
and Senators are right to ask more probing questions.
True, one of a lower-court judge’s most conspicuous roles is to apply
binding precedent correctly. Although controlling law governs that role,
we have demonstrated that settled law is a distinct concept and,
importantly, one that has ramifications beyond the Supreme Court’s
decision to uphold or overrule one of its own precedents. In the doctrinal
area, for example, lower-court judges often must decide whether a civil
rights plaintiff may recover damages or whether the defendant is entitled
to qualified immunity because the law was unsettled. A lower-court
judge’s normative view of the law—whether a legal question was
correctly decided—can be quite relevant to that inquiry.300 Moreover, a
judge’s willingness to find a question descriptively settled through
persuasive authority also requires a degree of judgment that goes beyond
mechanically applying binding precedent. In short, controlling law does
not mark the outer boundary of a lower-court judge’s job, and a promise
of fidelity to controlling law should not end the conversation. Settled law
still matters.
CONCLUSION
In response to an attorney’s claim that a legal dispute was a trivial
semantic disagreement, Justice Felix Frankfurter eloquently replied: “All
our work, our whole life is a matter of semantics, because words are the
tools with which we work, the materials out of which laws are made, out

298 E.g., Meckler & Barnes, supra note 9 (noting that “more than two dozen nominees have
declined to answer” whether Brown was “properly decided”).
299 For example, Judge Wendy Vitter said that Brown “is Supreme Court precedent. It is
binding . . . and of course I would uphold it.” Mahita Gajanan, Trump Judicial Nominee Won’t
Say If She Supports Brown v. Board of Education, Time (Apr. 12, 2018), https://time.com/5237672/wendy-vitter-brown-v-board-segregation/ [https://perma.cc/L8A4-HY2F].
300 See supra notes 246–51 and accompanying text (describing role of the normative
formalist framework in the qualified immunity analysis).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Settled Law

117

of which the Constitution was written. Everything depends on our
understanding of them.”301
No doubt, this project is a semantic exercise. Although settled law has
proved doggedly enigmatic, it captures something essential about the way
that lawyers and informed citizens think about the judiciary’s role. Away
from the bright lights of confirmation hearings, settled law exerts a quieter
but equally profound influence on an array of doctrines. It helps determine
whether citizens may hold government officials accountable for violating
civil rights and serves as a backstop on questions about the judicial
system’s fundamental integrity. So, Justice Frankfurter was right. At least
across this range of politics and doctrine, everything indeed depends on
semantics.

301 William T. Coleman Jr., Counsel for the Situation: Shaping the Law To Realize
America’s Promise 78 (2010) (quoting Justice Frankfurter).

